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Abstract 
We propose a model of abduction based on the revision of the epistemic state of an agent. 
Explanations must be sufficient o induce belief in the sentence to be explained (for instance, some 
observation), or ensure its consistency with other beliefs, in a manner that adequately accounts for 
factual and hypothetical sentences. Our model will generate xplanations that nonmonotonically 
predict an observation, thus generalizing most current accounts, which require some deductive 
relationship between explanation and observation. It also provides a natural preference ordering 
on explanations, defined in terms of normality or plausibility. To illustrate the generality of our 
approach, we reconstruct wo of the key paradigms for model-based iagnosis, abductive and 
consistency-based diagnosis, within our framework. This reconstruction provides an alternative 
semantics for both and extends these systems to accommodate our predictive explanations and 
semantic preferences on explanations. It also illustrates how more general information can be 
incorporated in a principled manner. 
1. Introduction 
It has become widely recognized that a lot of reasoning does not proceed in a 
“straightforward” deductive manner. Reasonable conclusions cannot always be reached 
simply by considering the logical consequences (relative to some background theory) of 
some known facts. A common pattern of inference that fails to conform to this picture is 
abduction, the notion of finding an e~plunation for the truth of some fact. For instance, 
if the grass is wet, one might explain this fact by postulating that the sprinkler was 
turned on. This is certainly not a deductive consequence of the grass being wet (it may 
well have rained). 
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Abduction has come to play a crucial role in knowledge representation and reasoning, 
across many areas of AI. In discourse interpretation, one often wants to ascribe beliefs 
to a speaker that explain a particular utterance, perhaps gaining insight into the speaker’s 
intentions [30]. More generally, plan recognition often proceeds abductively. In high- 
level scene interpretation [ 511, an interpretation can be reached by postulating scene 
objects that explain the appearance of objects in an image. Probably the most common 
use of abductive inference in AI is in the area of model-based diagnosis. Given unex- 
pected observations of the behavior of an artifact or system, a diagnosis is usually taken 
to be some set of components, the malfunctioning of which explains these observations 
[ 14,17,24,43,49]. 
Traditionally, the process of abduction has been modeled by appeal to some sort of de- 
ductive relation between the explanandum (or fact to be explained) and the explanation 
(the fact that renders the explanandum plausible). Hempel’s [ 291 deductive-nomologicul 
explanations fall into this category, requiring that the explanation entail the explanandum 
relative to some background knowledge. Broadly speaking, this picture of abduction can 
be characterized as follows: an explanation for /3 relative to background theory T will be 
any (Y that, together with T, entails /3 (usually with the additional constraint that {a} UT 
be consistent). Such a picture is adopted in much research on abduction [ 3550,541. 
Theories of this type are, unfortunately, bound to the unrelenting nature of deductive 
inference. There are three directions in which such theories must be generalized. 
First, we should not require that an explanation deductively entail its observation 
(even relative to some background theory). There are very few explanations that do not 
admit exceptions. The sprinkler being on can explain the wet grass; but the sprinkler 
being on with a water main broken is not a reasonable explanation. Yet this exceptional 
condition does not make the initial explanation any less compelling. Rather it illustrates 
that explanations may entail their conclusions in a defeusible or nonmonotonic sense. 
Second, while there may be many competing explanations for a particular observation, 
certain of these may be relatively implausible. While a tanker truck exploding in front 
of the yard may explain the wet grass in the sense described above, this is certainly not 
as reasonable an explanation as the sprinkler being turned on. Thus, we require some 
notion of preference to chose among these potential explanations. 
Third, the deductive picture of explanation does not allow one to explain facts that 
are inconsistent with the background theory. Such explanations are, in fact, among the 
most important; for it is facts that conflict with existing expectations that most urgently 
require explanation. This is the case in diagnostic applications, for example, where 
observations to be explained contradict our belief that a system is performing according 
to specification. 
The first two of these problems can be addressed using, for example, probabilistic 
information [ 17,29,4l, 461. We might simply require that an explanation render the 
observation sufficiently probable. Explanations might thus be nonmonotonic in the sense 
that a may explain /?, but LY /\ y may not (e.g., P( p 1 a) may be sufficiently high while 
P( p / cz A y) may not). For instance, it is highly likely that the grass becomes wet 
when the sprinkler is turned on, but it is unlikely to become wet if the water main is 
broken. Preference can also be given to explanations that are more likely. A tanker truck 
exploding in front of the yard is much less probable than the sprinkler being turned on. 
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There have been proposals to address these issues in a more qualitative manner using 
“logic-based” frameworks also. Peirce (see Rescher [ 521) discusses the “plausibility” 
of explanations, as do Quine and Ullian [48]. Consistency-based diagnosis [ 16,49 3 
uses abnormality assumptions to capture the context-dependence of explanations; and 
preferred explanations are those that minimize abnormalities. Poole’s [44] assumption- 
based framework captures some of these ideas by explicitly introducing a set of default 
assumptions to account for the nonmonotonicity of explanations. 
In this paper we propose a semantic framework and logical specification of abduction 
that captures the spirit of probabilistic proposals, but does so in a qualitative fashion. 
Explanations are given a defeasible aspect through the use of techniques for default 
reasoning and belief revision. Furthermore, explanations are viewed as more or less 
plausible according to a qualitative notion of plausibility, a relation naturally induced by 
the preferences associated with our defaults. Finally, by relying on existing theories of 
belief revision, explanations for facts that conflict with existing beliefs can be provided. 
In particular, such conflicting observations will require explanations that themselves 
force an agent to revise its beliefs. 
Our account will take as central subjunctive conditionals of the form A + B, which 
can be interpreted as asserting that, if an agent were to believe A it would also believe B. 
Such a conditional can be consistently held even if A is believed to be false. This is the 
cornerstone of our notion of explanation: if believing A is sufficient to induce belief in B, 
then A explains B. This determines a strong, predictive sense of explanation; but weaker 
forms of explanation can also be captured. Semantically, such conditionals are interpreted 
relative to an ordering of plausibility or normality over possible worlds. This ordering 
is taken to represent the epistemic state of an agent; thus all forms of explanation we 
describe can be classified as epistemic explanations. Our conditional logic, described in 
earlier work as a representation of belief revision and default reasoning [ 3,7,9], has the 
desired nonmonotonicity and induces a natural preference ordering on sentences (hence 
explanations). 
In the next section we describe abduction, belief revision, our conditional logics and 
other necessary logical preliminaries. In Section 3, we discuss the concept of explanation, 
its epistemic nature, and how different types of explanations can be captured in our 
framework. We also introduce the notion of preferred explanations, howing how the 
same conditional information used to represent the defeasibility of explanations induces 
a natural preference ordering. To demonstrate the expressive power of our model, in 
Section 4 we show how Poole’s [ 43,441 Theorist framework (without constraints) and 
Brewka’s [ 121 extension of Theorist can be captured in our logics. This reconstruction 
explains semantically the non-predictive and paruconsistent nature of explanations in 
Theorist. It also illustrates the correct manner in which to augment Theorist with a notion 
of predictive explanation and how one should capture semantic preferences on Theorist 
explanations. These two abilities have until now been unexplored in this canonical 
abductive framework. In Section 5, we reconstruct a canonical theory of consistency- 
bused diagnosis due to de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter [ 16,491 in our logics. This again 
suggests extensions of the theory and illustrates the natural similarities and distinctions 
between consistency-based and abductive diagnosis. 
Proofs of main theorems may be found in the appendix. 
2. Abduction and belief revision 
In this section, we briefly discuss some previous work on abduction, drawing attention 
to the aspects of these various proposals that influence our approach. We also describe 
the AGM model of belief revision of Alchourr6n. Gkdenfors and Makinson [2]; and 
we present the conditional logics required to capture this theory of revision, due to 
Boutilier [ 91. This will provide the logical apparatus required to describe the process 
of abduction in terms of belief revision. 
2.1. Abduction 
Abduction is the process of inferring certain facts and/or laws that render some 
sentence plausible, that explain some phenomenon or observation. The sentence to be 
explained is often denoted the exphzandum. We will use the term “observation” instead, 
for typically we are interested in explaining some observed fact. This is merely sug- 
gestive, however, for hypothetical possibilities can be explained as well. The sentences 
(facts or laws) doing the explaining are often dubbed the explanans sentences. Though 
the term is often used to characterize this inference process, we will use “explana- 
tion” more simply to refer to the explanans sentences. Thus, an explanation renders an 
observation plausible (in some yet to be determined sense). 
The most basic and, in some idealized sense, the most compelling form of abduction 
is represented by Hempel’s [ 291 deductive-nomologicul explanations. Such explanations 
consist of certain specific facts and universal generalizations (scientific laws) that, taken 
together, deductively entail a given observation. For example, the observation “This thing 
flies.” can be explained by the fact “This thing is a bird.” and the law “All birds fly.” 
As Hempel observes, often parts of the explanation are left unstated with the explicitly 
provided explanation being elliptical. If it is understood among participants in some 
discourse that all birds fly, then “This thing is a bird.” alone is a reasonable explanation. 
Suppose we take T to be some theory capturing the relevant background knowledge 
(this may be some scientific or commonsense theory). Then the sentence LY explains 
observation /? just when 
We will be less concerned with the nomological aspects of abduction, assuming that 
relevant laws are captured in some background theory. ’ Thus, our notion of explanation 
will be elliptical in this sense, taking background information for granted. 
The criteria for deductive explanations are clearly too strong to allow wide applica- 
bility. In commonsense reasoning and scientific inquiry very few explanations have such 
strength. One accepts as a reasonable explanation for wet grass that the sprinkler was 
turned on; but this explanation is not (deductively) conclusive. The grass may have 
been covered by a tarpaulin, the water pressure may have fallen at a crucial instance, 
any of a number of other exceptional conditions can defeat this inference. Of course, 
’ In fact, as we will see in Section 3. the “theory” is implicit in the epistemic state of our reasoning agent. 
We will have a few things to say about laws in our framework in the concluding section. 
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we may claim that “the sprinkler was turned on” is elliptical, implicitly assuming that 
none of these exceptional circumstances hold, and that the true explanation includes the 
denial of these. However, this runs into the qual@xztion problem of default reasoning, 
the problem of having to know that such conditions are false [ 381. This view is also 
untenable when such qualifications cannot be listed, or the phenomenon in question is 
inherently probabilistic (at least, given our current knowledge). To take an example of 
Hempel, Jim’s close exposure to his brother who has the measles explains Jim catching 
the measles; but it certainly doesn’t imply Jim catching the measles. 
A number of methods for specifying probabilistic explanations have been proffered. 
Hempel [ 291 requires that the explanation make the observation highly probable. Thus, 
probabilistic explanations still retain the essential predictive power of deductive expla- 
nations. Other accounts make less stringent requirements. For instance, Gardenfors [ 221 
insists only that the explanation render the observation more probable than it is a priori. 
A key component of the G;irdenfors theory is that the judgements of probability are 
rendered with respect to the epistemic state of an agent. We return to this in Section 3. 
Because of their probabilistic nature, such explanations are nonmonotonic or defeu- 
sible. It may be that SprinklerOn explains WetGrass, since this observation is very 
probable given the explanation. But the stronger proposition SprinklerOn A Covered 
is not a reasonable explanation, for the probability of wet grass is quite low in this case. 
Our goal is to capture this type of explanation in a qualitative fashion. Rather than rely- 
ing on probabilistic information, we will provide an account of defeasible explanations 
based on the “default rules” held by an agent. 
Both deductive and probabilistic models of abduction typically give rise to a num- 
ber of competing explanations for a given observation. The propositions Rain and 
SprinklerOn both explain WetGrass. If an agent has to choose among competing 
explanations, there must exist some criteria for this choice. An obvious preference crite- 
rion on explanations is based on the likelihood of the explanations themselves. An agent 
should choose the most probable explanation relative to a given context. Such accounts 
are often found in diagnosis [ 15,461 and most probable explanations are discussed by 
Pearl [ 4 1 ] . In a more qualitative sense, one might require that adopted explanation(s) 
be among the most “plausible”. This view is advocated by Peirce (see Rescher [ 521) 
and Quine and Ullian [48]. The notion of minimal diagnosis in the consistency-based 
models of diagnosis [49] is an attempt to qualitatively characterize most probable di- 
agnoses. We will provide a formal framework in which such qualitative judgements of 
plausibility can be made. 
One of the areas of AI that most frequently appeals to abductive inference is model- 
bused diagnosis. Given a theory describing the correct behavior of some system or 
artifact, one can make predictions about its behavior based on some given information. 
One might expect a certain observation based on information about other parts of the 
system. For example, given the inputs to a digital circuit, the background theory (or 
system description) allows one to deduce the value of the outputs. Should the actual 
observation differ from the expected observation then the system must not conform to 
the system description (assuming the input values are correct). The goal of model- 
based diagnosis is to discover an explanation for the aberrant behavior, usually some 
set of components of the system that, if behaving abnormally, will entail or excuse 
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the actual observation. The two main paradigms for model-based diagnosis are the 
abductive approaches, of which Poole’s [ 43,441 Theorist framework is representative, 
and consistency-based models such as that of de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter [ 16,491. 
These will be discussed in detail in Sections 4 and 5. 
2.2. Conditionals and belief revision 
The account of abduction we propose relies heavily on the notion of belief revision. 
For instance, a predictive explanation requires that belief in the explanation be sufficient 
to induce belief in the observation. Therefore we must be able to test the epistemic state 
of an agent after it (hypothetically) adopts a potential explanation, or test a knowledge 
base once it is revised to incorporate the explanation. A theory of belief revision thus 
lies at the core of epistemic explanation. 
We assume an agent to have a deductively closed set of beliefs K taken from some 
underlying language. For concreteness, we will assume this language LC~L to be that of 
classical propositional logic generated by some set of variables P. We will often take K 
to be the closure of some finite set of premises, or knowledge base, KB; so K = Cn( KB) . 
The expansion of K by new information A is the belief set Kz = Cn( K U {A}). This 
is a seemingly reasonable method of belief change when K p 7A. More troublesome 
is the revision of K by A when K k 1A. Some beliefs in K must be given up before 
A can be accommodated. The problem lies in determining which part of K to give 
up. Alchourrbn, Gardenfors and Makinson [2] have proposed a theory of revision (the 
AGM theory) based on the following observation: the least “entrenched” beliefs in K 
should be given up and A added to this contracted belief set. 
We use Ki to denote the belief set resulting when K is revised by A. The AGM 
theory logically delimits the scope of acceptable revision functions. To this end, the 
AGM postulates below are maintained to hold for any reasonable notion of revision 
[221. 
(Rl ) KT, is a belief set (i.e. deductively closed). 
(R2) A E K;. 
(R3) KT, C K;. 
(R4) If 1A 6 K then KI 2 Ki. 
(R5) Ki = Cn( I) iff k 1A. 
(R6) If /= A E B then Ki = Ki. 
(R7) K:,,B C (K;);. 
(R8) If-B $ Ki then (Ki); C KiAB. 
The semantics of AGM revision functions will be described below. 
An alternative model of revision is based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment 
[22]. Given a belief set K, we can characterize the revision of K by ordering beliefs 
according to our willingness to give them up when necessary. If one of two beliefs 
must be retracted in order to accommodate some new fact, the least entrenched belief 
will be relinquished, while the most entrenched persists. Gardenfors [22] presents five 
postulates for such an ordering and shows that these orderings determine exactly the 
space of revision functions satisfying the AGM postulates. We let B 6 A denote the 
fact that A is at least as entrenched as B in theory K. A complete set of sentences of this 
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form is sufficient to specify a revision function. We note that the dual of an entrenchment 
ordering is a plausibility ordering on sentences. A sentence A is more plausible than 
B just when -A is less entrenched than lB, and means that A would be more readily 
accepted than B if the opportunity arose. Grove [28] studied this relationship and its 
connection to the AGM theory. 
Another form of belief change studied within the AGM theory is the process of 
contraction, or rejecting a belief in a belief set. When the belief set K is contracted 
by A, the resulting belief set K; is such that A is no longer held. The AGM theory 
provides a set of postulates for contraction as well. This process is related to revision 
via the Levi and Harper identities: 
K; = KnK:, and Ki = (K7A)I. 
2.2.1. The logics CO and CO* 
Boutilier [ 91 presents a family of bimodal logics suitable for representing and reason- 
ing about the revision of a knowledge base. We briefly review the logics and associated 
possible worlds semantics for revision. We refer to [ 93 for further details and motivation. 
Semantically, the process of revision can be captured by considering a plausibility 
ordering over possible worlds. We can reason about such structures, as well as AGM 
revision (and several generalizations of it), using a family of bimodal logics. The 
language LB is a bimodal language formed from a denumerable set P of propositional 
variables, together with the usual classical connectives and two modal operators q and 
6. Intuitively, CIA is read as “A holds at all equally or more plausible worlds,” while 
6A is read “A holds at all less plausible worlds.” We denote by Lcp~ the propositional 
sublanguage of Lg. We will define four bimodal logics based on this language. 
Our semantics is based on structures consisting of a set of possible worlds W and 
a binary ordering relation < over W, reflecting the relative degree of plausibility of 
worlds. The interpretation of < is as follows: u 6 w iff v is at least as plausible as w. 2 
As usual, v is more plausible than w (v < w) iff v < w but not w 6 v. Plausibility 
is a pragmatic measure that reflects the degree to which one is willing to accept w as 
a possible state of affairs. If v is more plausible than w, loosely speaking, v is “more 
consistent” with an agent’s beliefs than w. We take reflexivity and transitivity to be 
minimal requirements on <, dubbing any such model a CT40-model. 
Definition 2.1 [7]. A CT40-model is a triple M = (W, <,4p), where W is a set (of 
possible worlds), < is a reflexive, transitive binary relation on W (the ordering relation), 
and (D maps P into 2w ((p(A) is the set of worlds where A is true). 
Sentences in LB are interpreted in the usual way, with the truth of a modal formula 
at world w in M (where M k,,, A means A is true at w) given by 
( 1) M +,,, q A iff for each v such that v 6 w, M b, A. 
(2) M +, 6A iff for each v such that v $ w, M k, A. 
‘Having “more” plausible elements denoted as “lesser” in the ordering is consistent with the usual AI 
practice of preferring minimal elements in some ordering-in this case, the more plausible worlds. 
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If M k, A we say that M satisfies A at w. For any sentence A, we use IlAll to denote 
the set of worlds w E W that satisfy A (assuming some fixed M). Each world in this 
set is an A-world. For an arbitrary set of formulae S, we use IlSi] to denote those worlds 
satisfying each A E S and refer to these as S-worlds. Somewhat loosely we dub those 
worlds that falsify some A E 5’ to be -S-worlds. We now define several new connectives 
as follows: 
OA --df TOTA; 6A -_df -i?-7A; :A -df CIA A 6A; 8A -_df OA V 6A. 
It is easy to verify that these connectives have the following truth conditions: 
(a) M kw OA iff for some ~3 such that (* < w, M b,, A. 
(b) M k,. bA iff for some L’ such that 1’ < w. M k,. A. 
(c) M b,. GA iff for all c E W, M k,. A. 
(d) M k,. ?A iff for some I$ t W, M k, A. 
These connectives have the obvious readings: q A means “A is true at all equally or more 
plausible worlds”; OA means “A is true at some equally or more plausible world”; EA 
means “A is true at all less plausible (and incomparable) worlds”; bA means “A is true 
at some less plausible (or incomparable) world”; EdA means “A is true at all worlds, 
whether more or less plausible”; finally, 8A means “A is true at some world, whether 
more or less plausible.” Validity and satisfiability are defined in a straightforward manner 
and a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic CT40 is provided in [ 71. 
A natural restriction on the ordering of plausibility is connectedness; that is, for any 
pair of worlds w, u, either c < w or w < 0. In other words, all worlds must have 
comparable degrees of plausibility. This restriction gives rise to the logic CO (again 
axiomatized in [ 71) 
Definition 2.2. [7] A CO-model is a triple M = (W, 6, q), where M is a CT40-model 
and < is totally connected. 
In any reflexive, transitive Kripke frame, a cluster is any maximal mutually accessible 
set of worlds [53]: a set C C: W is a cluster just when u < w for all L’, w E C and 
no extension C’ > C has this property. We note that CO-structures consist of a totally- 
ordered set of clusters of equally plausible worlds, while CT40-models consist of a 
partially-ordered set of clusters. Fig. 1 illustrates this, where each large circle denotes 
a cluster of equally plausible worlds and arrows point in the direction of increasing 
plausibility. 
Finally, both CT40 and CO can be extended by restricting attention to those structures 
in which all logically possible worlds are represented. No matter how implausible, each 
should be somehow ranked and should occur in our models. This property turns out to 
be crucial in characterizing the AGM theory of belief revision. 
Definition 2.3 [ 7 1. Let M = (W, <, cp) be a Kripke model. For all w E W, w* is defined 
as the mapping from P into (0, 1 } such that w*(A) = 1 iff w E q(A) (w* is the 
valuation associated with w). 
CT40*-models and CO*-models are (respectively) CT40-models and CO-models 
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Fig. 1. CT40 and CO models. 
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satisfying the condition that 
{f : f maps P into (0, 1)) C {w” : w E W}. 
This restriction is captured axiomatically determining the logics CT40* and CO* [7]. 
2.2.2. Modeling belief revision 
Assume we have a fixed (CO- or CT40-) model M. We use min(cY) to denote the 
set of most plausible cr-worlds in M: 3 
min(a) = {w : w k ff, and u < w implies u p LL}. 
In both models in Fig. 1, the shaded regions denote the worlds that make up min(A). 
The revision of a belief set K can be represented using CT40- or CO-models that 
reflect the degree of plausibility accorded to worlds by an agent in such a belief state. 
To capture revision of K, we insist that any such K-revision model be such that IJK(j = 
min( T); that is, the model must have a (unique) minimal cluster formed by [[Kll. 4 
This reflects the intuition that all and only K-worlds are most plausible for an agent 
with belief set K [ 91, and corresponds to a form of only knowing [4,36]. The CT40- 
model in Fig. 1 (a) is a K-revision model for K = Cn( TA, B), while the CO-model in 
Fig. 1 (b) is suitable for K = Cn( 1A). 
To revise K by A, we construct the revised set Ki by considering the set mm(A) 
of most plausible A-worlds in M. In particular, we require that llK~l[ = mm(A); thus 
B E Ki iff B is true at each of the most plausible A-worlds. We can define a conditional 
connective + such that A + B is true in just such a case: 
A+B =_df B(A>O(A A q (A>B))). 
3 We assume, for simplicity, that such a (limiting) set exists for each (Y E I&L, though the following 
technical developments do not require this [ 7,9]. 
4 This constraint can be expressed in the object language LB; see [4,9]. 
This is equivalent to the requirement that 
mm(A) C IIBIl 
Both models in Fig. I satisfy A --+ B, since B holds at each world in min( A), the 
shaded regions of the models. 
The Ramsey test 1571 provides acceptance conditions for subjunctive conditionals 01 
the form “If A were the case, then B would hold” by appeal to belief revision. Indeed, 
the conditional should be accepted just when an agent, hypothetically revising its beliefs 
by A. accepts B. Thus, we can equate the conditional A + B with the statement B E Ki 
and interpret our conditional as a certain type of epistemic subjunctive conditional. For 
a specific K-revision model we can define the revised belief set Ki as 
Boutilier ]Y] shows that the revision functions determined by CO*-models are exactly 
those that satisfy the AGM postulates. The revision functions captured by the weaker 
logics impose slightly weaker constraints on the revision functions: CT40 and CT40* 
fail to satisfy postulate (Rg), while CT40 and CO satisfy slightly weaker versions of 
most of the postulates. Intuitively, a K-revision model captures the epistemic state of an 
agent, both its beliefs and its revision policies. A belief connective can be defined in the 
object language: ’ 
B(A) -_df T =+ A 
We briefly describe the contraction of’ K hy -3A in this semantic framework. To retract 
belief in -A, we simply accept the worlds in min( A) as epistemically possible without 
rejecting the possibility of K-worlds. In other words. 
ilKAl = IlKI umin(A). 
This is due to the fact that certain A-worlds must become epistemically possible if 1A 
is not to be believed, and the principle of minimal change suggests that only the most 
plausible A-worlds should be accorded this status. The belief set Kz* does not contain 
TA, and this operation captures the AGM model of contraction if we restrict our attention 
to CO*-models. In Fig. 1 (a) KQ, = Cn( B), while in Fig. 1 (b) K7A = Cn( A > B). 
A key distinction between CT40 and CO-models is illustrated in Fig. 1: in a CO- 
model, all worlds in min(A) must be equally plausible, while in CT40 this need not 
be the case. Indeed, the CT40-model shown has two maximally plausible sets of A- 
worlds (the shaded regions), yet these are incomparable. We denote the set of such 
incomparable subsets of min( A ) by P1( A ) : 
PI(A) = {min( A) n C : C is a cluster}. 
Thus, we have that min( A) = uP~( A ). Taking each such subset (each element of 
PI( A ) ) to be a plausible revised state of affairs rather than their union, we can define 
’ See 14 1 for a more comprehensive dcfnition of behcf and a proof of correspondence to the belief logic 
weak S5. 
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a weaker notion of revision using the following connective. It reflects the intuition that 
the consequent C holds within some element of Pi(A): 
(A + C) zdf &TA) V 8(A A q (A 3 C)). 
The model in Fig. l(a) shows the distinction: it satisfies neither A + C nor A =+ TC, 
but both A + C and A + -42. There is a set of comparable most plausible A-worlds 
that satisfies C and one that satisfies %. Notice that this connective is puruconsisrent in 
the sense that both C and -C may be “derivable” from A, but C A -C is not. However, 
-+ and + are equivalent in CO, since mm(A) must lie within a single cluster. This 
weak connective will be primarily of interest when we examine the Theorist system in 
Section 4. 
We define the plausibility of a proposition by appealing to the plausibility ordering 
on worlds. We judge a proposition to be just as plausible as the most plausible world at 
which that proposition holds. For instance, if A is consistent with a belief set K, then 
it will be maximally plausible-the agent considers A to be epistemically possible. We 
can compare the relative plausibility of two propositions semantically: A is at least as 
plausible as B just when, for every B-world w,~here is some A-world that is at least 
as plausible as w. This is expressed in Lg as q ( B > OA). If A is (strictly) more 
plausible than B, then as we move away from llKl[, we will find an A-world before a 
B-world; thus, A is qualitatively “more likely” than B. In each model in Fig. 1, A A B 
is more plausible than A A TB. We note that in CO-models plausibility totally orders 
propositions; but in CT40, certain propositions may be incomparable by this measure. 
2.2.3. Default rules and expectations 
The subjunctive conditionals defined above have many properties one would expect 
of default rules. In particular, the conditional is defeasible. For instance, one can assert 
that if it rains the grass will get wet (R + W), but that it won’t get wet if the grass 
is covered ((R A C) +- -IV). As subjunctive conditionals, these refer to an agent 
adopting belief in the antecedent and thus accepting the consequent. In this case, the 
most plausible R-worlds must be different from the most plausible R A C-worlds. 
These conditionals have much the same character as default rules. Recently, a num- 
ber of conditional logics have been proposed for default reasoning [ 18,26,33,34]. In 
particular, Boutilier [ 71 has proposed using the logics CT40 and CO together with the 
conditional 3 for default reasoning. To use the logics for this purpose requires simply 
that we interpret the ordering relation < as ranking worlds according to their degree 
of normality. On this interpretation, A + B means that B holds at the most normul 
A-worlds; that is, “If A then normally B.” These default logics are shown to be equiva- 
lent to the preferential and rational consequence operations of Lehmann [ 33,341. They 
are also equivalent to the logic of arbitrarily high probabilities proposed by Adams [ 11 
and further developed by Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 261, and can be given a probabilistic 
interpretation [ 71. 
Boutilier [9] also shows how default reasoning based on such a conditional logic 
can be interpreted as a form of belief revision, hence explaining the equivalence of 
the conditional logic representation of both processes. Gardenfors and Makinson’s 1231 
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notion of expectation inference adopts a similar viewpoint. Roughly, we think of default 
rules of the form A =S B as inducing various expectations about the normal state of 
affairs. In particular, for any such default an agent expects the sentence A > B to 
be true in the most normal state of affairs. An agent without specific knowledge of 
a particular situation should then adopt, as a “starting point”, belief in this theory of 
expectations. In other words, an agent’s “initial” beliefs should be precisely its default 
expectations. When specific facts F are learned, the agent can revise this belief set 
according to the revision model capturing its default rules. The revised belief set will 
then correspond precisely to the set of default conclusions the agent would reach by 
performing conditional default reasoning from this set of facts using its conditional 
default rules (see [9] for details). For this reason, our theory of explanation can be 
used in one of two ways. We may think of explanations relative to the epistemic state 
of an agent. This is the viewpoint adopted in Section 3 where we present our theory. 
We may also interpret the conditionals involved in explanation as default rules. This 
interpretation will be implicit in Sections 4 and 5 in our reconstruction of model-based 
diagnosis, where plausibility orderings are in fact normality orderings. 
3. Epidemic explanations 
Often scientific explanations are postulated relative to some background theory con- 
sisting of various scientific laws, principles and facts. In commonsense domains, this 
background theory should be thought of as the belief set of some agent. We will there- 
fore define explanations relative to the epistemic state of some agent or program. We 
assume this agent to possess an objective (or propositional) belief set K. We also assume 
the agent to have certain judgements of plausibility and entrenchment at its disposal to 
guide the revision of its beliefs. These may be reflected in the conditionals held by the 
agent, explicit statements of plausibility, or any other sentences in the bimodal language 
that constrain admissible plausibility orderings. Such a theory may be complete-in the 
sense that it determines a unique plausibility ordering-or incomplete. For simplicity, 
we assume (initially) that an agent’s theory is complete and that its epistemic state 
is captured by a single K-revision model. We discuss later how one might compactly 
axiomatize such a categorical theory, and how explanations are derived for incomplete 
theories. 
Defining explanations relative to such structured epistemic states extends the usual 
deductive and probabilistic approaches. There an explanation must be added to an 
agent’s “theory” to account for an observation. This restrictive view precludes meaningful 
explanations of observations other than those consistent with K. In fact, it is often 
explanations for observations that conJlict with our current beliefs in which we are 
most interested. Thus, a model of belief revision seems crucial for explanations of 
this sort. In order to account for such explanations, one must permit the belief set 
(or background theory) to be revised in some way that allows consistent explanations 
of such observations. Gardenfors [ 221 has proposed a model of abduction that relies 
crucially on the epistemic state of the agent doing the explaining. Our model finds 
its origins in his account, but there are several crucial differences. First, G?irdenfors’s 
C. Boutilier; V Becher/Art@cial Intelligence 77 (1995) 43-94 55 
model is probabilistic whereas our model is qualitative. As well, our model will provide 
a predictive notion of explanation (in a sense described below). In contrast, Gardenfors 
makes no such requirement, counting as explanations facts that only marginally affect 
the probability of an observation. However, we share with Gardenfors the idea that 
explanations may be evaluated with respect to states of belief other than that currently 
held by an agent. 
Levesque’s [35] account of abduction is also based on the notion of an epistemic 
state. Levesque allows the notion of “belief’ to vary (from the standard deductively- 
closed notion) within his framework in order to capture different types of explanation 
(e.g., a syntax-motivated notion of simplest explanation). Our model is orthogonal in 
that the notion of “implication” between explanation and observation is weakened. 
In this section, we introduce several forms of epistemic explanation and their charac- 
terization in terms of revision. There are two key dimensions along which these forms of 
explanation are compared, predictive power and the epistemic status of the observation 
to be explained. 
If belief in the explanation is sufficient to induce belief in the observation, the expla- 
nation is said to be predictive. Deductive-nomological explanations have this form, as 
do probabilistic explanations based on high probability. However, weaker, non-predictive 
explanations are also of interest. These must simply render the observation reasonable, 
without necessarily predicting it. Consistency-based diagnosis adopts this perspective. 
Exposure to a virus may explain one’s having a cold without having the predictive power 
to induce the belief that one will catch cold (prior to observing the cold). Predictive 
and non-predictive explanations are discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. We 
will also distinguish two forms of non-predictive explanations: weak explanations and 
the even weaker might explanations. 
Explanations may also be categorized according to the epistemic status of the ex- 
planandum, or “observation” to be explained. There are two types of sentences that 
we may wish to explain: beliefs and non-beliefs. If p is a belief held by the agent, it 
requires a factual explanation, some other belief cy that might have caused the agent 
to accept p. This type of explanation is clearly crucial in many reasoning applications. 
An intelligent program will provide conclusions of various types to a user; but a user 
should expect a program to be able to explain how it reached such a belief, or to justify 
its reasoning. We may ask a robot to explain its actions, or an expert system to explain 
its predictions. The explanation should clearly be given in terms of other (perhaps more 
fundamental) beliefs held by the program. When explaining belief in p, a program or 
agent that offers a disbelieved sentence o is performing in a misleading manner. A 
second type of explanation is hypothetical: even if p is not believed, we may want an 
explanation for it, some new belief the agent could adopt that would be sufficient to 
ensure belief in p. This counterfactual reading turns out to be quite important in AI, 
for instance, in diagnostic tasks (see below), planning, and so on [ 251. For example, 
if turning on the sprinkler explains the grass being wet and an agent’s goal is to wet 
the grass, then it may well turn on the sprinkler. We can further distinguish hypothetical 
explanations into those where observation p is rejected in K (i.e., -$ E K) and those 
where observation p is indeterminate in K (i.e., p 6 K and -p # K). Regardless of 
the predictive power required of an explanation, factual and hypothetical explanations 
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will require slightly different treatment. 
The type of explanation one requires will usually depend on the underlying appli- 
cation. For instance, we will see that hypothetical explanations, whether predictive or 
non-predictive, play a key role in diagnosis. Whatever the chosen form of explanation, 
certain explanations will be deemed more plausible than others and will be preferred on 
those grounds. We will introduce a model of preference in Section 3.3 that can be used 
to further distinguish explanations in this fashion. 
3.1. Predictive explanations 
In very many settings, we require that explanations be predictive; that is, if an agent 
were to adopt a belief in the explanation, it would be compelled to accept the observation. 
In other words, the explanation should be sufficient to induce belief in the observation. 
Legal explanations, discourse interpretation, goal regression in planning, and diagnosis 
in certain domains all make use of this type of explanation. 
To determine an appropriate definition of predictive explanation, we consider the 
factual and hypothetical cases separately. If the observation p is believed, as argued 
above, we require that a suitable explanation (Y also be believed. For example, if asked 
to explain the belief Wet&-ass, an agent might choose between Rain and SprinklerOn. 
If it believes the sprinkler is on and that it hasn’t rained, then Rain is not an appropriate 
explanation. This leads to our first condition on explanations: if observation /3 is accepted 
(i.e., p E K) then any explanation (Y must also be accepted (i.e., cy E K). 
If p is not believed, it may be rejected or indeterminate. In the first instance, where 
/3 is rejected, we insist that any explanation (Y also be rejected (i.e., TLY E K). If this 
were not the case then (Y would be consistent with K. According to the AGM theory 
and our model of revision, this means that accepting (Y would be tantamount to adding 
LY to K, and -/3 would still be believed. For example, suppose an agent believes the 
grass is not wet and that the sprinkler may or may not be on. To explain (or ensure) 
wet grass, it should not accept the sprinkler being on (or turn it on), for according to 
its beliefs the sprinkler may well be on-yet the grass is not believed to be wet. 
In the second instance, where p is indeterminate, we insist that any explanation also 
be indeterminate (i.e., LY @ K and ~cx e K). If (Y E K, clearly accepting (Y causes 
no change in belief and does not render p believed. Dismissing explanations (Y where 
TCY E K requires more subtle justification. Intuitively, when /3 is indeterminate, it is an 
epistemic possibility for the agent: for all the agent knows p could be true. If this is 
the case, it should be explained with some sentence that is also epistemically possible. 
If ycy E K the agent knows cy to be false, so it should not be willing to accept it as 
an explanation of some fact p that might be true. Since learning p conflicts with none 
of its beliefs, so too should a reasonable explanation be consistent with its beliefs. For 
example, suppose an agent is unsure whether or not the grass is wet, but believes that 
it hasn’t rained. Upon learning the grass is wet, accepting rain as an explanation seems 
unreasonable. 6 
’ Below we will briefly explanations where this condition is weakened 
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Combining these criteria for both factual and hypothetical explanations, we have the 
following condition relating the epistemic status of observation /3 and explanation a~ 
(ES) (Y E K iff p E K and icy E K iff -$ E K. 
Assuming an agent o possess a unique revision model M reflecting its current epistemic 
state, we can express this in the object language as 
klj=(Ba~BP) A (BTYEBTP). 
If the epistemic state is captured by some (possibly incomplete) theory in the language 
LB, we can test this condition using entailment in the appropriate bimodal ogic. 
We note here that this condition relating the epistemic status of explanation and obser- 
vation is at odds with one prevailing view of abduction, which takes only non-beliefs to 
be valid explanations. On this view, to offer a current belief (Y as an explanation is un- 
informative; abduction should be an “inference process” allowing the derivation of new 
beliefs. We take a somewhat different view, assuming that observations are not (usually) 
accepted into a belief set until some explanation is found and accepted. In the context 
of its other beliefs, observation p is unexpected to a greater or lesser degree. Unex- 
plained “belief’ in p places the agent in a state of cognitive dissonance. An explanation 
relieves this dissonance when it is accepted [221. After this process both explanation 
and observation are believed. Thus, the abductive process should be understood in terms 
of hypothetical explanations: when it is realized what could have caused belief in an 
(unexpected) observation, both observation and explanation are incorporated. In this 
sense, our use of the term observation is somewhat nontraditional-it is a fact that has 
yet to be accepted (in some sense) as a belief. Fucrual explanations are retrospective 
in the sense that they (should) describe “historically” what explanation was acfuully 
adopted for a certain belief. We will continue to call such beliefs “observations”, using 
the term generally to denote a fact to be explained. 
Apart from the epistemic status of observation and explanation, we must address the 
predictive aspect of explanations. In particular, we require that adopting belief in the 
explanation LY be sufficient o induce belief in the observation p. The obvious criterion 
is the following predictive condition: 
which is expressed in the object language as cr + p. This captures the intuition that Zf 
the explanation were believed, so too would be the observation [ 371. For hypothetical 
explanations, this seems sufficient, but for factual explanations (where /3 E K), this 
condition is trivialized by the presence of (ES). For once we insist that a valid expla- 
nation LY be in K, we have Kz = K; and clearly p E Kz for any belief cy. But surely 
arbitrary beliefs should not count as valid explanations for other beliefs. The belief that 
grass is green should not count as an explanation for the belief that the grass is wet. 
In order to evaluate the predictive force of factual explanations, we require that the 
agent (hypothetically) give up its belief in /3 and then find some LY that would (in 
this new belief state) restore p. In other words, we contract K by p and evaluate the 
conditional (Y + p with respect o this contracted belief state: 
58 C. Boutilier; V Sedrer/ArtQ‘iciul Inrelligence 77 (1995) 43-94 
(PF) P t W& 
Thus, when we hypothetically suspend belief in /3, if (Y is sufficient to restore this belief 
then cy counts as a valid explanation. The contracted belief set K; might fruitfully be 
thought of as the belief set held by the agent before it came to accept the observation 
P. 
An (apparently) unfortunate consequence of this condition is the difficulty it intro- 
duces in evaluation. It seems to require that one generate a new epistemic state, reflecting 
the hypothetical belief set Ki, against which to evaluate the conditional cy + p. Thus, 
(PF) requires two successive changes in belief state, a contraction followed by a revi- 
sion. 7 However, it turns out that the condition (ES) ensures that one can effectively test 
(PF) without resorting to hypothetical contraction. We first note that (PF) reduces to 
(P) for hypothetical explanations; for if p 6 K then Ki = K. For factual explanations, 
(ES) requires that both LY and /3 are believed. The following proposition shows that 
(PF) can be evaluated without iterated belief change. 
Proposition 3.1. If a, p E K, therr ,O E (KP )z iff la E Kzp. 
Thus condition (PF), in the presense of (ES), is equivalent to the following condition 
pertaining to the absence of the observation: 
which is expressed in the object language as -p + 1~. This captures the intuition that 
If the observation had been absent, so too would the explanation. 
This condition is now vacuous when the observation is rejected in K, for Kzp = K 
and we must have la E K by (ES). It seems plausible to insist that an agent ought to 
imagine the explanation to be possible and then test if rejection of the observation leads 
to rejection of the explanation: in other words: 
However, just as (PF) reduces to (A), so too does (AR) reduce to (P). 
Proposition 3.2. !f ?a, -p t K, then -xx t ( KQ) T$ iff p E Kz 
Thus, we are led to the notion of a predictive explanation, relative to some epistemic 
state. 
Definition 3.3. Let M be a K-revision model reflecting the epistemic state of an agent 
with belief set K. A predictive explanation for observation /? (relative to M) is any 
u E Lcp~ such that: 
7 This is especially problematic, for the AGM theory provides no guidance as to the conditionals an agent 
should adopt in this contracted belief state. Very little can be known about the content of belief sets that are 
changed more than once as required by (PF) The AGM theory does not provide a method for determining the 
structure of the resulting epistemic state, even if the original epistemic state and belief set K are completely 
known (but for a recently developed model that captures such iterated revision, see 16 I). 






Fig. 2. Explanations for “wet grass”. 
(ES) M k (Ba = BP) A (Bla = B+); 
(P) M j= a s- p; and 
(A) M k-p+ -CX. 
The reductions afforded by Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are crucial, for they allow an 
agent to test whether an explanation is valid relative to its current epistemic state (or 
its current set of simple conditionals). An agent is not required to perform hypothetical 
contraction. 
This definition captures both factual and hypothetical predictive explanations. Further- 
more, once the epistemic status of /? is known we need only test one of the conditions 
(A) or (P). 
Proposition 3.4. If CY, p E K then CY (predictively) explains /3 iff -p + TX. 
Proposition 3.5. If a, /I, -WY, -+ # K then o! (predictively) explains /3 i$ a + p iff 
-$I =9 -xx. 
Proposition 3.6. If -w, -/3 E K then cy (predictively} explains j3 iff CY + p. 
Example 3.7. Fig. 2 illustrates both factual and hypothetical explanations. In the first 
model, the agent believes the following are each false: the grass is wet ( W), the sprinkler 
is on (S), it rained (R) and the grass is covered (C). W is explained by sprinkler S, 
since S =+ W holds in that model. So should the agent observe W, S is as possible 
explanation; should the agent desire W to be true (and have control over S) it can 
ensure W by causing S to hold. Similarly, R explains W, as does S A R. Thus, there 
may be competing explanations; we discuss preferences on these below. Intuitively, 
LY explains /3 just when p is true at the most plausible situations in which ff holds. 
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Thus, explanations arc defeusible: W is explained by R; but, R together with C does 
not explain wet grass, for R A C + 7W. Notice that R alone explains W, since the 
“exceptional” condition C is normally false when R holds, thus need not be stated. This 
defeasibility is a feature of explanations that has been given little attention in many 
logic-based approaches to abduction. 
The second model illustrates factual explanations for W. Since W is believed, explana- 
tions must also be believed. R and -S are candidates, but only R satisfies the condition 
on factual explanations: if we give up belief in W, adding R is sufficient to get it back. 
In other words, ?W 3 ?R. This does not hold for 4 because -W ==s S is false. 
The crucial features of predictive explanations illustrated in this example are their 
defeasibility, the potential for competing explanations, and the distinction between factual 
and hypothetical explanations. 
Notice that if we relax the condition (ES) in the factual example above, we might 
accept S as a hypothetical explanation for factual belief W. Although, we believe R, W 
and -6, one might say that “Had the sprinkler been on, the grass (still) would have been 
wet.” This slightly more permissive form of predictive explanation, called countelfactual 
explanation, is not explored further here (but see [ lo] for further details). 
3.1.1. Causal explanations 
The notion of explanation described here cannot be given a truly causal interpretation. 
In the factual model in Fig. 2, we suggested that rain explains wet grass. However, it 
is also the case that wet grass explains rain. Explanations are simply beliefs (whether 
factual or hypothetical) that induce belief in the fact to be explained. The connection 
may be causal (belief in R induces belief in W) or evidential (belief in W induces 
belief in R). 
Ultimately, we would like to be able to distinguish causal from non-causal explana- 
tions in this conditional model. Lewis [ 371 has proposed a counterfactual analysis of 
causation, whereby a theory of conditionals might be used to determine causal rela- 
tions between propositions. More recently, and perhaps more compelling, is the use of 
stratijied rankings on conditional theories by Goldszmidt and Pearl [27] to represent 
causation. Incorporating such considerations in our model brings to mind Shoham’s 
[55] epistemic account of causality, whereby a causal theory is expressed in terms of 
the knowledge of an agent, and can be nonmonotonic. Whether or not causality is an 
epistemic notion (cf. the critique of Galton [ 201)) it is clear that perceived causal re- 
lations will have a dramatic impact on the conditional beliefs of an agent. Furthermore, 
it is the epistemic state of an agent with respect to which causal predictions and ex- 
planations must be derived. In this regard, an epistemic theory of causal explanation is 
consistent with Shoham’s viewpoint. However, a more sophisticated account of causation 
is necessary in order to distinguish causal from evidential relations among an agent’s 
beliefs. 8 A more suitable theory should include some account of actions, events, and 
s Temporal precedence, one mechanism available in Shoham’s theory, cannot resolve such issues in general. 
For instance, the truth of E at time t may be evidence for the truth of fact F at time I -t 1 without having 
caused it. 
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“intervention” [27]. For instance, if a (possibly hypothetical) mechanism exists for 
independently wetting the grass ( W) and making it rain (R), this can be exploited 
to show that W does not cause R, but that R causes W, according to the plausibility 
judgements of an agent. Such experimentation r experience can be used to distinguish 
causal from evidential explanations. 
Another similarity between conditionals and Shoham’s causal statements are their 
context-sensitivity. Simon [ 561 argues that one potential drawback in Shoham’s theory is 
the necessity of distinguishing cuusul from contextual conditions and the asymmetry this 
introduces. While this may or may not be a necessary feature of “true” causal relations, 
it is a fact of life in any useful epistemic account, for we naturally communicate and 
acquire our causal knowledge making such distinctions. Simon finds disquieting the 
fact that the roles of cause and contextual condition are sometimes reversed; but the 
dependence of the form of causal utterances on circumstances is exactly what we capture 
when we evaluate causal statements with respect o an epistemic state. Imagine an agent 
possesses two conditionals R =S W and R A C + -W: the grass gets wet when it 
rains unless it’s covered. Taking 1C to be the normal case, it seems natural to offer R 
as a causal explanation (or cause) for W, and take -C to be a contextual condition. 
This offers a certain economy in thinking about and communicating causes. However, 
in a different epistemic setting, without altering the underlying physical causal relations 
(whatever they may be, or if they even exist), these roles may reversed. If the grass 
is typically covered, we may have R + TW and R A -X + W. Supposing that it 
usually rains, T + R, an intuitive causal explanation for W relative to this epistemic 
state is now -4, someone uncovered the grass. R is relegated to the role of contextual 
condition. This asymmetry, far from being problematic, is natural and desirable. We 
do not delve further into causal explanations here, but we conjecture that conditional 
logics will provide a natural and flexible mechanism for representing causal relations 
and generating causal explanations with an epistemic flavor. 
3.2. Nonpredictive xplanations 
3.2.1. Might explanations 
Very often we are interested in weaker types of explanation that do not predict an 
observation, but merely “allow” it. For example, suppose Fred has a choice of three 
supermarkets at which to shop, one very close (A), and two rather farther away (B 
and C). We expect Fred to shop at the closest A, but observe that he actually chooses 
to shop at C. We might explain Fred’s choice by claiming that (D) Fred dislikes the 
service at market A. However, explanation D does not predict that Fred will choose C, 
for he may well have chosen B. That is, we do not accept the conditionals D + C 
or D =S B, but only D + B V C. In a sense D “excuses” or permits C but does not 
predict C. If we learned D, we would claim that Fred might go to C. Upon learning C, 
we adopt the explanation D. A similar example is captured by the hypothetical model 
in Fig. 2: here W permits both R and S without predicting them. Might explanations of
this type play an important role in consistency-based diagnosis without fault models as 
well (see Section 5). 
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Intuitively, a might explanation reflects the slogan 1’ the explanation were believed, 
the observation would be a possibility. The sense of “possible” here is naturally that 
of epistemic possibility. If an agent accepts explanation (Y, the observation p becomes 
consistent with its new belief set. The might condition is simply 
which is expressed as cy #+ -/I. 
For hypothetical explanations ot’ rejected p (where -p E K), might explanations 
require nothing further. However, for explanations of indeterminate p, we must weaken 
the condition (ES). If /I is indeterminate, it is already a possibility for the agent, and 
we should not rule out beliefs LY t K as potential might explanations: if LY is believed 
(it is!) then p is possible (it is!). Such might explanations are not very informative, 
however, so we take the principle case for might explanations to be that where p is 
rejected. Thus, (ES) is again replaced by (F) : 9 
(F) If p E K then LY g K. 
Definition 3.8. Let M be a K-revision model reflecting the epistemic state of an agent 
with belief set K. A might explanation for observation p (relative to M) is any (Y E Lcp~ 
such that: 
(F) M k B/3 > BLY; and 
CM) MkaSj+. 
Intuitively, the epistemic state induced by acceptance of (Y must contain &worlds, 
hence rendering /3 possible. If it contains only P-worlds then (Y is a predictive explana- 
tion. Predictive explanations are therefore a special (stronger) case of might explana- 
tions. 
Proposition 3.9. Jf a is u predictive explanation ,for p then CY is a might explanation 
for /I 
We take might explanations to be the primary form of non-predictive explanation. 
3.2.2. A variant of might explanations 
In this section we describe a form of might explanation that is of particular relevance to 
CT40-models, where clusters of equally plausible worlds are partially ordered rather than 
totally ordered. This form of explanation is somewhat difficult to motivate independently, 
but in Section 4 we will see that it is precisely the type of explanation used by Theorist. 
Clearly, a sentence (Y can be a might explanation for both /? and -p. This is similar 
to the behavior of the weak conditional connective +, where LY -+ p and CY 4 -p 
can be held consistently. Recall that a sentence LY --+ /3 holds just when p holds at all 
‘This weakening of (ES) does not affect he principle case where -p E K. If TX @ K, then (Y + -p 
cannot hold. SO -0 E K ensures YCY E A’ for all might explanations. 
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worlds in some element of Pl( cr), (i.e., at minimal cluster of cu-worlds). We call (Y a 
weak explanation for p just in case it is a might explanation such that cy + p. 
Definition 3.10. Let M be a K-revision model reflecting the epistemic state of an agent 
with belief set K. A weak explanation for observation /I (relative to M) is any cy E Lcp~ 
such that: 
(F) M b B/3 > Ba; and 
(W) Ml=o+P. 
Intuitively, weak explanations lie between predictive and might explanations. They are 
stronger than might explanations, for they require, at some cluster of most plausible LY- 
worlds, that p holds. All other most plausible a-worlds are of incomparable plausibility, 
so in some sense LY is “potentially predictive” (it “could” be that the relevant cluster 
is actually min( a), if only one could render all worlds comparable). On the other 
hand, weak explanations are weaker than predictive explanations in the sense that certain 
min (a) -worlds do not (in the principle case) satisfy the observation. Weak explanations 
are therefore a special (stronger) case of might explanations. 
Proposition 3.11. If a is a weak explanation for /3 then (Y is a might explanation for 
P. 
Naturally, in the logic CO, since ff + p iff LY + /l, weak explanations are predictive. 
Therefore, weak explanations will only be used in the context of CT40-models. In the 
CT40-model in Fig. 1 (a), A is a weak explanation for both C and X. 
3.3. Preferences 
The explanations defined above carry the explanatory force we expect, whether predic- 
tive or not, yet are more flexible than deductive explanations. They exhibit the desired 
defeasibility, allowing exceptions and more specific information to override their ex- 
planatory status. However, the criteria we propose admit many explanations for a given 
observation in general: any LY sufficient to induce belief in p counts as a valid predic- 
tive explanation. For instance, rain explains wet grass; but a tanker truck full of milk 
exploding in front of the yard also explains wet grass. If you could convince someone 
that such an event occurred, you would convince them that the grass was wet. 
Certainly some explanations should be preferred to others on grounds of likelihood 
or plausibility. In probabilistic approaches to abduction, one might prefer most probable 
explanations. In consistency-based diagnosis, explanations with the fewest abnormalities 
are preferred on the grounds that (say) multiple component failures are unlikely. Such 
preferences can be captured in our model quite easily. Our CT40- and CO-structures 
rank worlds according to their degree of plausibility, and reasonable explanations are 
simply those that occur at the most plausible worlds. We recall from Section 2.2 the 
notion of plausibility as applied to propositions. A is at least as plausible as B just 
when, for every B-world w, there is some A-world that is at least as plausible as w. 
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For CO-models, this totally orders propositions; but for CT40-models, two propositions 
may have incomparable “degrees” of plausibility. 
An adopted explanation is not one that simply makes an observation less surprising, 
but one that is itself as unsurprising as possible. We use the plausibility ranking to judge 
this degree of surprise. 
Definition 3.12. If (Y and cr’ both explain /3 then cy is at least as preferred as a’ (written 
LY <p a’) iff M k E( a’ > Oa). The preferred explanations of p are those cy such that 
for no explanation a’ is it the case that (Y’ <I> cy. 
Preferred explanations are those that are most plausible, that require the “least” change 
in belief set K in order to be accepted. Examining the hypothetical model in Fig. 2, we 
see that R, S and R A S each explain W; but R and S are preferred to R A S (it may not 
be known whether the sprinkler was on or it rained, but it’s unlikely that the sprinkler 
was on in the rain). Any world in which a tanker truck explodes is less plausible than 
these other worlds, so that explanation is given relatively less credibility. 
By basing the notion of preference on the relative plausibility of explanations, we lose 
the ability to distinguish factual explanations from one another. The conditions (ES) 
and (FS) ensure that every valid explanation of a factual observation is believed, and 
all beliefs are equally (and maximally) plausible for an agent. Thus, each candidate 
explanation is preferred. This fits well with the point of view adopted above: an agent, 
when accepting p, also accepts its most plausible explanation(s). There is no need, 
then, to rank factual explanations according to plausibility - all explanations in K are 
equally plausible. If one wanted to distinguish possible explanations of some belief 
p, one might distinguish the hypothetical explanations of p in the contracted belief 
state K;. Most plausible explanations are then those that the agent judged to be most 
plausible before accepting /3. However, such a move serves no purpose, for the most 
preferred explanations in state Ki must be beliefs in K. 
Proposition 3.13. Let p E K and cy be a predictive explanation for /3. Then (Y is a 
preferred (hypothetical) explanation for p in KF. 
It is not hard to see that preferences cannot be applied to hypothetical explanations of 
indeterminate p for precisely the same reason: all valid explanations must be epistemi- 
tally possible, and therefore maximally plausible, this because (ES) requires icy $! K. 
For these reasons, when describing preferences, we restrict our attention to hypothetical 
explanations of rejected /I. 
A predictive explanation needn’t be compared to all other explanations in order to 
determine if it is most preferred. The following proposition indicates a simpler test for 
preference. 
Proposition 3.14. Let (Y be a predictive explanation for /3 relative to model M. Then (Y 
is a preferred explanation iff M k /3 ft ~a. 
This test simply says that in any cluster of most normal P-worlds, if (Y is a preferred 
C. Bouriiier. V Becher/Art@cial Intelligence 77 (1995) 43-94 65 
explanation of p, then an a-world must occur somewhere in that cluster, for this is 
(potentially) the most plausible cluster of situations in which the observation holds. 
The test is greatly simplified, and much clearer, for totally-ordered CO-models. This 
is due to the equivalence of + and + under CO. 
Proposition 3.15. Let a be a predictive explanation for p relative to CO-model M. 
Then (Y is a preferred eqlanation iff M 1 p + ~a. 
In this case, LY is a preferred explanation iff belief in /3 does not preclude the possibility 
of (Y. Preferred explanations are those that are most plausible, that require the “least” 
change in belief set K in order to be accepted. Examining the hypothetical model in 
Fig. 2, we see that W # 7R and W + -6 holds, but W + l(S A R) is false. So R 
and S are preferred explanations, while explanation S A R is not. lo 
3.4. The pragmatics of explanation 
In any actual system for explanation, ultimately a sentence must be returned which 
explains the given observation. The semantic conditions we have proposed admit expla- 
nations that are intuitively unsatisfying in some circumstances. Of the many explana- 
tions, some may be preferred on grounds other than plausibility. Natural criteria such 
as simplicity and informativeness are often used to rule out certain explanations in 
certain contexts [47]. Levesque [ 351 has proposed criteria for judging the simplicity 
of explanations. Hobbs et al. [30] argue that in natural language interpretation most 
specific explanations are often required, rather than simple explanations. In diagnostic 
systems, often this problem is circumvented, for explanations are usually drawn from a 
prespecified set of conjectures [ 441 (see Sections 4 and 5). 
It is clear that the exact form an explanation should take is influenced by the applica- 
tion one has in mind. Therefore, we do not include such considerations in our semantic 
account of abduction. Rather, we view these as pragmatic oncerns, distinct from the 
semantic issues involved in prcdictiveness and plausibility (cf. Levesque [ 351). Provid- 
ing an account of the pragmatics of explanations is beyond the scope of this paper; but 
we briefly review two such issues that arise in our framework: trivial explanations and 
irrelevant information. 
3.4.1. Trivial explanations 
A simple theorem of CT40 and CO is /3 + p. This means that /? is always a 
predictive (and preferred) explanation for itself. While this trivial explanation may 
seem strange, upon reflection it is clear that no other proposition has a stronger claim 
on inducing belief in an observation than the observation itself. This makes the task 
of explanation quite simple! Unfortunately, a system that provides uninformative trivial 
explanations will not be deemed especially helpful. 
lo When there are several disjoint preferred explanations (e.g., R, S), we may be interested in covering 
explanations, that capture all of the plausible causes of an observation. We refer to [ 101 for a discussion of 
this notion. 
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We expect pragmatic considerations, much like Gricean maxims, to rule out uninfor- 
mative explanations where possible. For instance, one might require that an explanation 
be semantically distinct from the observation it purports to explain. However, the seman- 
tics should not rule out trivial explanations. In some applications a trivial explanation 
may be entirely appropriate. Consider causal explanations in a causal network. One 
might expect a causal explanation for a node having a particular value to consist of 
some assignment of values to its ancestors. However, when asked to explain a root 
node, no explanation but the trivial explanation seems appropriate. Presumably, in any 
abstract model of a domain. causes (hence causal explanations) cannot be traced back 
ad injinitum. ’ ’ 
3.4.2. Irrelevant in$xmatinrr 
Very often one can strengthen or weaken an explanation with extraneous information 
and not affect its explanatory power. But such constructions often result in explanations 
that are intuitively unsatisfying. Suppose as usual that the sprinkler being on explains 
wet grass, so S + W. Suppose furthermore that the conditionals S =+ 0 and S =+ -0 are 
both rejected by the agent, where 0 stands for “Fred’s office door is open”, something 
about which our agent has no information. A simple inference ensures that (S A 0) + W 
and (S A -0) + W both hold. Thus, S A 0 and S A -0 both explain W. Yet, intuitively 
both of these explanations are unappealing-they contain information that is irrelevant 
to the conclusion at hand. 
In order to rule out such explanations, we expect the pragmatic component of an 
abductive system to filter out semantically correct explanations that are inappropriate 
in a given context. In Poole’s Theorist system, for example, explanations are drawn 
from a prespecified set of conjectures. We can view this as a crude pragmatic “theory”. 
Levesque [ 351 embeds a syntactic notion of simplicity in his semantics for abduction. 
In our conditional framework one can define conditions under which a proposition is 
deemed irrelevant to a conditional [ 3,2 11. 
Explanations can also be strengthened with “background information” that, while not 
irrelevant, can be left unstated. For instance, returning to the example given by the 
factual model in Fig. 2, we can see that R explains W, and R A -C explains W as 
well. However, since -C normally holds when R holds (i.e., R =+ -C), it can be left 
as a tacit assumption. Certainly, -C is relevant, for R A C =+ lW, but it needn’t be 
stated as part of the explanation. This suggests that logically weak explanations are 
to be (pragmatically) preferred. It also suggests a mechanism whereby an abductive 
system can elaborate or clarify its explanations. Should an explanation be questioned, 
the system can identify tacit knowledge that is deemed relevant to the explanation and 
elaborate by providing these facts. 
One can weaken explanations by disjoining certain information to valid explanations, 
retaining explanatory power. In general, if A explains B, and C is less plausible that A, 
then A V C explains B as well. Since (A V C) + A (because C is less plausible than 
A), we must have (A V C) + B. If rain explains wet grass, so does “It rained or the 
lawn was covered.“, since C is less plausible than R. Once again, we view the weaker 
” “Why is the grass wet?’ “Because it rained.” “Why did it rain‘?” “It just did!” 
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explanation as violating (something like) the Gricean maxim of informativeness: the 
explanation R is certainly more informative that the weaker R V C (but still relevant). 
The explanation R V C also carries with it the unwanted implicature that both disjuncts 
are (individually) valid explanations. This is strongly related to the following issue that 
arises in the study of conditional logics: sentences with the linguistic form (A V C) =+ B 
are usually intended to represent an assertion with the logical form (A + B) V (C + B) 
[401. 
4. Abductive models of diagnosis 
One of the main approaches to model-based diagnostic reasoning and explanation are 
the so-called “abductive” theories. Representative of these models is Poole’s [43,44] 
Theorist framework for explanation and prediction, and Brewka’s [ 121 extension of 
it. In this section, we describe both models, how they can be embedded within our 
framework, and how the notions we defined in the last section can be used to define 
natural extensions of the Theorist framework. This also provides an object-level semantic 
account of Theorist. 
4.1. Theorist and preferred subtheories 
Poole [43,44] presents a framework for hypothetical reasoning that supports expla- 
nation and default prediction. Theorist is based on default theories, pairs (3, D) where 
F and D are sets of sentences. l2 The elements of .F are facts, known to be true of 
the situation under investigation. We take D to be a set of defaults, sentences that are 
normally true, or expectations about typical states of affairs. Although nothing crucial 
depends on this, we assume D to be consistent. Poole also uses a set C of conjectures 
that may be used in the explanation of observations, but should not be used in default 
prediction. I3 
Definition 4.1 [44]. An extension of (3, D) is any set Cn(3 U D) where D is a 
maximal subset of D such that 3 U D is consistent. 
Intuitively, extensions are formed by assuming as many defaults as possible. Since 
defaults are expected to be true, each extension corresponds to a “most normal” situation 
at which .F holds. A (skeptical) notion of default prediction is defined by considering 
what is true at each such normal situation. 
I2 Poole’s presentation is first-order, using ground instances of formulae in the definitions to follow. For 
simplicity, we present only the propositional version. 
I3 The following definitions are slightly modified, but capture the essential spirit of Theorist. We ignore two 
aspects of Theorist, constrainrs and names. While constraints can be used to rule out undesirable extensions 
for prediction, it is generally accepted that priorities, which we examine below, provide a more understandable 
mechanism for resolving conflicts. The role of constraints in explanation has largely been ignored. Named 
defaults add no expressive power to Theorist; they can be captured by introducing the names themselves as 
the only (atomic) defaults. 
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Definition 4.2 [ 441. Sentence A is predicted by (3, D) iff A is in each extension of 
(3, q. 
Conjectures play a key role in abduction, and can be viewed as possible hypotheses 
that (together with certain defaults) explain a given observation p. 
Definition 4.3 [ 441. C U D is a (Theorist) explanation for observation p (with respect 
to(3,~,C))iffCcC,Dc~,CUDIJ3isconsistentandCUDU3~~. 
Since we take defaults to be assumptions pertaining to the normal course of events, 
the set C of adopted conjectures carries the bulk of the explanatory force of a Theorist 
explanation. Just as we ignore “causal rules” and “scientific laws” in our earlier definition 
of predictive explanation, here we take the default component of an explanation to be 
“understood”, and take a set C of conjectures to be a Theorist explanation iff there is 
some set of defaults D that satisfies the required relation. We assume sets C, D and 3 
are finite and sometimes treat them as the conjunction of their elements. 
Example4.4. Let 3 = {(/,A}, 23 = {U > A,A > E,U > 7E,R > ‘P} and C = 
{U, A, E}, where U, A, E, R and P stand for university student, adult, employed, 
Republican and Pucijst, respectively. The extensions of this default theory are 
Cn(U,A,U > A,A > E,R > ,P}, 
Cn{U,A,U > A,U > -E, R > ,P}. 
Thus A is predicted, but neither E nor TE are predicted. 
Suppose now that 3 = 8. The conjecture A explains E, but does not explain -E. 
Thus, if one adopted belief in A, one would predict E. In a similar fashion, U explains 
E; but U also explains -E. Notice that 7P is not explainable. 
The last explanation in this example illustrates that Theorist explanations are, in 
a certain sense, paruconsistent: a conjecture may explain both a proposition and its 
negation. Certainly, such explanations cannot be construed as predictive. Notice also 
that certain propositions may not have explanations of the type defined by Theorist, but 
can be explained (nontrivially) if we allow explanations that do not lie within the set 
of conjectures. Intuitively, we might want to admit R as a valid explanation of -P even 
though it is not listed among our assumable hypotheses in C. 
In the example above, the second extension is more satisfying than the first. The fact 
that university students are a specific subclass of adults suggests that the default rule 
U > 1E should be applied instead of A > E. Brewka [ 121 has extended the Theorist 
framework for default prediction by introducing priorities on defaults to handle such a 
situation. 
Definition 4.5. A Brewka theory is a pair (3, (271,. . . , D,,)) where 3 is a set of facts 
and each V; is a set of defaults. 
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Intuitively, (Vi,. . . , D,,) is an ordered set of default sets, where the defaults in the 
lower ranked sets have higher priority than those in the higher ranked sets. We will 
say that default d E Vi has priority over default e E Vj if i < j. When constructing 
extensions of such a theory, if two default rules conflict, the higher priority rule must 
be used rather than the lower priority rule. Multiple extensions of a theory exist only 
when default rules of the same priority conflict with the facts or higher priority rules. A 
Theorist default theory (with no conjectures) (3,V) is a Brewka theory with a single 
priority level. The reduction of a Brewka theory to a (Theorist) default theory is (3, V), 
whereV=VtlJ. . . U V,,. Brewka’s preferred subtheories (hereafter dubbed extensions) 
are constructed in the obvious way. 
Definition 4.6. An extension of a Brewka theory (3, (Vi, . . . , ID”)) is any set 
E=Crz(3uDiU~~~UD,) 
where, for all 1 < k < n, 3U Vi U ... U Dk is a maximal consistent subset of 
3 U V, U . . . u D,. 
Thus, extensions are constructed by adding to 3 as many defaults from V1 as possible, 
then as many defaults from V2 as possible, and so on. The following proposition should 
be clear: 
Proposition 4.7. Every extension of a Brew& theory (3, (Vi, . . . , V,,)) is a Theorist 
extension of its reduction (3,V). 
Prediction based on a Brewka theory is defined in the obvious way, as membership 
in all extensions. It then becomes clear that: 
Proposition 4.8. A is predicted by a Brewka theory (3, (VI, . . . , D,,)) if it is predicted 
by its reduction (3, V). 
In other words, Brewka theories allow (typically strictly) more predictions than their 
Theorist counterparts. In the example above, should we divide V into priority levels by 
placing U > A and U > -E in Vi and A > E in V2, we are left with a single extension 
Cn{U, U > A, U > TE, R > ,P}, and 7E is predicted. 
Brewka does not provide a notion of explanation, but the Theorist definition of 
explanation will suffice. That is, cx explains /? iff {cr} U 3 is consistent with some set 
of defaults D C 271 U . . . U vk such that {LY} U 3 U D k /I. Again, we will often draw 
explanations from a prespecified set of conjectures. This definition retains the essential 
properties of the Theorist definition, in particular, its paraconsistent flavor. 
4.2. Capturing theorist in CT40 
Our goal is to represent and extend the notion of explanation in Theorist by embedding 
it within our conditional framework. This will have the effect of providing a semantic 
interpretation in our conditional logic for Theorist’s notion of explanation and prediction. 
-lo C. Boutdie< K Becher/Arti$cud Intelligence 77 (1995) 43-94 
In what follows, we assume a fixed, consistent set of defaults V, but the sets 3 and C 
of facts and conjectures, respectively, will be allowed to vary. I4 
The definitions of extension and prediction in Theorist suggest that the more defaults 
a situation satisfies, the more normal that situation is. We capture the normality criterion 
implicit in Theorist by ranking possible worlds according to the default sentences they 
falsify (or violate). 
Definition 4.9. For any possible world w t W, the set of defaults violated by w is 
If we interpret defaults as normality assumptions, clearly the ordering of worlds 
should be induced by set inclusion on these violation sets. This gives rise to a suitable 
CT40*-model, the Theorist structure, for a set of defaults V. 
Definition 4.10. The Theorist structure for V is MD = (W, 3, ‘p) where W is the set 
of truth assignments suitable for Lcp~; p is the valuation function induced by W; and 
L’ 6 w iff V(u) C: V(w). 
Proposition 4.11. Mz) is a CT40*-model 
The model MD divides worlds into clusters of equally plausible worlds that violate 
the same set of defaults in V. If V(w) = V( ~1) then w < u and u < w. Otherwise, u and 
w must be in different clusters. 
Proposition 4.12. C is a cluster in the model MD ifffor some D C D 
C={w:wbdifdED and wk-difdED-D}. 
Since V is finite, any model MD consists of a finite set of clusters. Fig. 3 depicts the 
Theorist model for the default set V = {U > A, A I) E, U > ‘E}. The bottom cluster 
contains those worlds that violate no defaults, that is, the most normal worlds. The 
middle clusters (from left to right) violate the default sets {U > A}, {U > ‘E} and 
{A I E}, respectively. The least plausible worlds violate the default set {U > A, U > 
1E). Notice that the model MD is sensitive to the syntactic structure of the default 
set V. Logically equivalent sets of defaults can result in drastica!ly different models, 
reflecting the syntax-sensitivity exhibited by Theorist. 
To interpret this model, we view the defaults in 2) as expectations held by an agent, 
statements regarding the most normal or plausible states of affairs. If an agent has 
no “factual beliefs”, it would adopt this set of defaults as its only beliefs. Thus, the 
model MD captures the epistemic state of an agent who has yet to encounter any 
I4 The consistency of the set 2) is not crucial to our representation, but allows the presentation to be simplified. 
We will point out various properties of our model that depend on this assumption and how they are generalized 
when 2) is not consistent. 
C. Boutilie,: c! Becher/Art@ial Intelligence 77 (1995) 43-94 71 
Fig. 3. Theorist model for the university students example. 
default violations. In a diagnosis application, we might think of such a belief state as 
representing the normal functioning of a system. Notice that since V is consistent the 
model MD has a unique minimal cluster. l5 
The facts 3 play no role in the definition of the model MD. The manner in which 
we define prediction and explanation relative to this model below will account for 3 by 
using these facts in the antecedents of relevant conditionals. This allows a single model 
to be used for a variety of different sets of facts. One can explicitly account for 3 in the 
model by ruling out any worlds falsifying 3 (e.g., by using the axiom cd3). However, 
we find the current formulation more convenient. 
4.2.1. Prediction 
Extensions of a default theory (3, D) are formed by considering maximal subsets 
of defaults consistent with the facts 3. Recall the definition of a most plausible set of 
A-worlds in a CT40-model for some proposition A from Section 2: 
Pf( A) = {min(A) n C : C is a cluster}. 
By Proposition 4.12, the worlds in some most plausible set of A-worlds must violate 
exactly the same defaults. In the Theorist model, an extension must then correspond to 
a set of most plausible 3-worlds. 
Proposition 4.13. E is an extension of (3, D) iff 11 El1 = S for some S E PI(3). 
Corollary 4.14. A is in some extension of (3, D) if MD k 3 + A. 
Theorist predictions are those sentences true in all extensions. Since min(3) = 
UP/(~), we have the following: 
I5 If 2) is inconsistent, then we will have a minimal cluster corresponding to each maximal consistent subset 
of ‘D; i.e., a minimal cluster for each extension of 7 = 0. 
Theorem 4.15. A is predicted (in Theorist sense) from default theory (3, D) iff M_D k 
3==+ 4. 
Thus, default predictions in Theorist correspond precisely to those sentences an agent 
would believe if it adopted belief in the facts 3. In other words, believing 3 induces 
belief in all (and only) default predictions. 
Consider the example illustrated in Fig. 3. We have A =S E and A =+ lC/, corre- 
sponding to the Theorist predictions E and -U when 3 = {A}. Notice that U Q A, 
U Q -A. lJ p E and U Q -E all hold. indicating that none of A, -A, E, 7E are 
predicted when 3 = {U}. But U =+ (E > A) holds so E > A is predicted by Theorist 
when 3 = {U}. 
4.2.2. Weak explanations 
To capture Theorist explanations, we assume the existence of a set C of conjectures 
from which possible explanations are drawn. Recall that C C C explains p (in the 
Theorist sense) iff C, together with 3 and some subset of defaults D C V, entails 
p. When this relation holds, there clearly must exist a maximal such set of defaults 
consistent with C. This allows us to restrict our attention to such maximal subsets of 
D. Essentially, we can exploit the result of Poole ensuring that p is explainable iff it 
is in some extension. The notion of weak explanation described in Section 3 precisely 
captures Theorist explanations. 
Theorem 4.16. Let C & C. Then C is a Theorist explanation for p iff MD /= (3 A C) + 
p and 3 A C is consistent, 
In other words, C is a Theorist explanation iff 3 A C is a weak explanation. I6 
The defeasibility of Theorist explanations is captured by the weak conditional 4. In 
MD above we have that A + -U, so A explains -U (indeed, 7U is explainable with 8). 
However, adding the fact 1E renders this explanation invalid, for (A A 1E) + -U. The 
paraconsistent nature of Theorist explanations corresponds precisely to the paraconsistent 
nature of the connective +. In the example above, we have U + E and U ----t TE, so 
when 3 = 8, U explains both E and 1E. If 3 = {A} then E is predicted; but U again 
explains TE, as well as E, for U A A + E and U A A + 7E both hold. 
4.2.3. Predictive explanations 
Some Theorist explanations do not exhibit this paraconsistent behavior. For instance, 
if 3 = {U} then E explains A since U A E - A. However, the even stronger relation 
U A E + A is true as well. Thus, given fact U, if E is adopted as a belief A becomes 
believed as well. The notion of predictive explanation as described in Section 3 seems 
especially natural and important. With respect to the Theorist model, we would expect 
a predictive Theorist explanation to be a set of conjectures C satisfying the relation 
” If explanations need not come from a prespecified pool of conjectures C, then any LY such that LY U 3 is a 
weak explanation will be considered a Theorist explanation. 
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C A 3 + p. While no such concept has been defined with the Theorist framework, we 
can extend Theorist with this capability. 
Using the original ingredients of Theorist, a predictive explanation should be such 
that all (rather than some) extensions of the explanation (together with the given facts) 
contain the observation. 
Definition 4.17. Let C & C and p be some observation. C is a predictive explanation 
for /3 iff /3 E E for all extensions E of (3 U C, 27). 
Since prediction is based on considering the most normal situations consistent with 
some facts, predictive explanations should be evaluated with respect to all most normal 
situations satisfying that explanation. This definition reflects precisely the predictive 
explanations (in the CT40 sense) sanctioned by the Theorist model MD. 
Theorem 4.18. Let C C C. Then C is a predictive Theorist explanation for /I ifs 
MD j= (3 A C) + p and 3 A C is consistent. 
Notice that while the normative aspect of predictive Theorist explanations is explicitly 
brought out by Definition 4.17 (in particular, by the restriction to m&mu1 subsets of 
defaults), it is implicit in the formulation (3 A C) + /3 of Theorem 4.18. This is due 
to the fact that the Theorist model MD is constructed in such a way that maximal sets 
of defaults are “preferred”, and the fact that (3 A C) =+ p is evaluated only in these 
most preferred situations satisfying 3 A C. 
In our example above, A predictively explains E (with no facts) since MD j= A =+ E. 
Naturally, predictive explanations are defeasible: MD p U A A =+ E so U A A fails to 
predictively explain E. If 3 = {V} then E predictively explains A since U A E + A. 
The notion of predictive explanation described for epistemic explanations suggests a 
very natural and useful extension of the Theorist framework. Theorem 4.18 ensures that 
the predictive explanations defined in Definition 4.17 match our intuitions, while the 
definition itself demonstrates how our predictive explanations can be added directly to 
the Theorist framework. 
4.2.4. Preferences 
As with most approaches to abduction, Theorist admits a number of possible ex- 
planations, whether weak or predictive, and makes no attempt to distinguish certain 
explanations as preferred to others. Even if we restrict attention to explanations that are 
formed from elements of a conjecture set C, certain explanations seem more plausible 
than others. For example, one may have a set of defaults 
inducing the Theorist model pictured in Fig. 4: rain and the sprinkler cause wet grass, 
and the sprinkler is on only if it isn’t raining. Assuming C = {R, S} and 3 = 8, each 
of R, S and R A S (predictively) explain W. However, inspection of the model Mv 
suggests that, in fact, the explanation R A S should be less preferred than the others. 
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Fig. 4. Theorlrt model for the wet grass example. 
This is due to the fact that the ordering of plausibility on propositions induced by MD 
makes R A S less plausible than R or S. 
Theorist provides no notion of preference of this type; but our definition of preference 
from Section 3 readily lends itself to application within the Theorist framework. In the 
parlance of Theorist, preferred explanations ought to be those that occur at the most 
plausible situations, or those that are consistent with as many defaults as possible. 
However, explanatory conjectures alone do not have the predictive force required-the 
facts F must also be considered. 
Definition 4.19. Let C. C’ C C be predictive Theorist explanations for p, relative to 
(3, D). C is at least as preferred us C’ (written C 63 C’) iff each maximal subset 
of defaults D’ C V consistent with C’ U 3 is contained in some subset of defaults 
D C: 2) consistent with C U F. Explanation C is a preferred explanation iff there is no 
explanation for p such that C’ <F C. 
In our example. R and S are equally preferred explanations since both are consistent 
with the entire set of defaults 22. The explanation R A S is less preferred because it 
conflicts with the default R > 3. 
It is possible, due to the fact that the plausibility relation determined by MD is 
not total, that two explanations are incomparable. If asked to explain (R V S) A -W, 
predictive explanations R A 1 W and S A 1 W are preferred to the explanation R A S A 7W. 
Yet these two preferred explanations are incomparable in the Theorist model. This notion 
of preference corresponds naturally to the plausibility ordering determined by MD. 
Theorem 4.20. Let C, C’ 2 C he predictive Theorist explunutions for p, relative to 
(F,D). Then C <3 C’ $Mz, /= E((C’ A _F) 3 O(C A 3)). 
Notice that the comparison of plausibility can be applied to nonpredictive explanations 
as well. We will see this in Section 5. 
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4.3. Capturing preferred subtheories in CT40 
The manner in which Theorist is embedded in our abductive framework also applies to 
Brewka’s preferred subtheories. For a Brewka theory (F, (Dt , . . . , Dn)) the plausibility 
of worlds is not determined solely by the number of rules violated, but also the priority 
of those rules. Implicit in the definition of an extension is the idea that any number 
of rules of lower priority may be violated if it allows a rule of higher priority to be 
satisfied. This gives rise to a new definition of rule violation. 
Definition 4.21. For any possible world w E W, the set of defaults of rank i violated 
by w is 
v(w) = {d E Di : w k ld}. 
A world that violates fewer high priority defaults than another world should be 
considered more plausible, even if the second world violates fewer low priority defaults. 
This gives rise to the Brewka structure for an ordered set of defaults (Dr , . . . , Dn). 
Definition 4.22. Let (Dl , . . . , D,,) be an ordered set of defaults, and let o, w be possible 
worlds. The minimal rank at which w and u difir is 
difs(w,u) =min{i: K(w) # x(u)}. 
If x(w) = K(U) for all i 6 n, by convention we let diI(w, u) = n + 1. 
Thus, difs( w, u) denotes the highest priority partition of default rules ‘Ddilfcw,“) within 
which w and u violate different rules. It is this set of rules that determines which of w 
or u is more plausible. 
Definition 4.23. The Brewka structure for (Dt , . . . , Dn) is MB = (u! 2, ‘p) where W is 
the set of truth assignments suitable for LCPL; q~ is the valuation function induced by 
W; and 0 < W iff vdilfcw,u)(u) c vdif(w,u)(w>. 
Proposition 4.24. Ma is a CT40*-model. 
Let us denote by 22 the set ‘Dt U. . . U 23,. The model MB, just as the Theorist model 
MD, divides worlds into clusters of equally plausible worlds that violate exactly the 
same set of defaults in D. 
Proposition 4.25. C is a cluster in the model MB @for some D C 2) 
C={w:wkdifdEDandwbTdifdEV-D}. 
However, the ordering of clusters is determined differently. In the Theorist model, only 
set inclusion is used to determine relative plausibility. In contrast, the Brewka model 
may rank a world u more plausible than a world w, even if V(U) $l V(w). In particular, 
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Fig. S. Brewka model for the university students example. 
we may have that ~1 violates a low priority rule that is satisfied by w. Fig. 5 depicts 
the Brewka model for the default sets D, = {U > A, U > -JE} and Vz = {A > E}. In 
contrast with the Theorist mode1 for the “flat” version of this theory (see Fig. 3), we 
see that worlds violating the rule A > E are more plausible than worlds violating either 
of the other two rules (individually). 
The notions of prediction and explanation in Brewka’s framework correspond to our 
conditional models of prediction and explanation, allowing results to be shown that are 
entirely analogous to those demonstrated above for Theorist. We omit proofs of the 
following results; they can be verified in a straightforward way by extending the proofs 
of the corresponding results for Theorist to accommodate the more refined ordering of 
clusters provided in Definition 4.23. 
Proposition 4.26. E is an extension of (3. (Q, , Dn)) iff llE/j = S for some S E 
Pl(3) in the model MB. 
Corollary 4.27. A is in some extension of (3, (‘Dl , . . , D,,)) iff MB b 3 + A 
Theorem 4.28. A is predicted from Brewka theory (3, (VI,. . . , Dn)) iff MB k 3 * A. 
Assuming some set of conjectures C, we have 
Theorem 4.29. Let C C C. Then C is u Theorist explanation for p relative to the 
Brewka theory (3, (VI,. . , D,,)) iff Ma k (3 A C) -+ j3 and 3 A C is consistent. 
We define predictive explanations for a Brewka theory in the same fashion as for 
Theorist. 
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Definition 4.30. Let C C C and /3 be some observation. C is a predictive explanation 
for p iff p E E for all extensions E of (3 U C, (271,. . . , D,J). 
Intuitively, an observation is predictively explained by some conjectures if, for every 
“maximal” set of defaults consistent with C and 3, the observation is entailed by 
the facts 3 and the conjectures C, together with these defaults. However, Brewka 
explanations rely on a definition of “maximality” that includes the consideration of 
priority of default rules. 
Theorem 4.31. Let C C C. Then C is a predictive Brewka explanation for p iff MB + 
(3 A C) =+ /I and 3 A C is consistent. 
Finally, preferences on explanations are also defined in the same manner, but again 
taking priorities into account. 
Definition 4.32. Let C, C’ C C be predictive Brewka explanations for /3, relative to the 
Brewka theory (3, (Dt , . . . , I&)). We call the set 
a maximal set of defQultsfor C iff 3UCUDI U..- U Dk is a maximal consistent subset 
of 3UCUDt u- . . U vk, for each 1 < k < n. C is at least as preferred as C’ (written 
C 6~ C’) iff for each maximal set of defaults UkGn{Di} for C’ there is a maximal set 
UkGn{Dk} for C such that Di c Dk for each 1 < k < n. 
Theorem 4.33. Let C, C’ & C be predictive Brewku explanations for j3, relative to the 
Brewk.a theory (3, (DI, . . . ,DJ). ThenC +C’iffM~ kz((C’A3) > O(CA3)). 
If we compare the Brewka model MB in Fig. 5 with the Theorist model for the 
same (unprioritized) set of defaults MD in Fig. 3, the differences in structure induced 
by priorities become clear. In a sense, the Brewka model has increased “connectivity”. 
While worlds that are comparable in the Theorist model remains so in MB, certain 
clusters of worlds that are incomparable become comparable in Ms. This leads, for 
instance, to the fact that U predicts 7E in MB, but does not in MD. This increased 
connectivity is, in fact, necessarily the case. 
Proposition 4.34. Let Ma be the Brewka model for (DI , . . . , ID,,> and Mv the Theorist 
model for its reduction V = V1 U - . + U ‘0,. Then u < w in MB whenever u C w in MD. 
Theorem 4.35. If MV b LY =S p then MB k cr + p. 
Thus any predictive explanation in Theorist is also a predictive xplanation when any 
set of priorities is introduced. 
Intuitively, one would expect priorities to prune away possible explanations. For 
predictive explanations, the opposite may occur, since priorities can only increase the 
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number of predictions admitted by a set of facts and conjectures. However, if we consider 
only preferred predictive explanations, we have more reasonable behavior. It becomes 
clear that priorities may, in fact, reduce the number of preferred explanations (and it 
cannot increase the number). 
We note that the representation of Theorist and Brewka models for a given set of 
defaults does not require that one specify the ordering relation for the model explicitly 
for each pair of worlds. One may axiomatize the model (relatively) concisely using 
techniques described in [ 31. The truth of conditionals determining explanations and 
preferences can then be tested against this theory. However, we are not suggesting that 
our conditional framework be used as a computational basis for explanations in simple 
Theorist-like theories. Rather, it brings to light the underlying semantic properties of 
Theorist and several principled extensions. 
5. Consistency-based diagnosis 
While the Theorist system may be used for diagnosis (as our examples in this section 
illustrate), it is presented more generally as a method for effecting arbitrary explanations. 
Another approach to model-based diagnosis is consistency-based diagnosis, which is 
aimed more directly at the diagnostic task, namely to determine why a correctly designed 
system is not functioning according to its specification. In this section, after presenting 
the fundamental concepts from Reiter’s [ 491 and de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter’s [ 161 
methodology for diagnosis, we show how these canonical consistency-based models can 
be embedded in our framework for epistemic explanations. This highlights many of the 
key similarities and differences in the abductive and consistency-based approaches. We 
also address the role fault models play within our semantics and how diagnoses can be 
made predictive. 
5.1. A logical speciJcation 
de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter [ 16,491 assume that an appropriate model of a 
system or artifact consists of two parts. The first is a set of components COMP, the 
parts of a system that one is able to distinguish and that (more or less) independently 
can fail to function correctly. The second is a set of logical sentences SD, the system 
description, that describes precisely the intended or normal functioning of the system. 
For example, given a certain set of inputs to a circuit, the system description should 
allow one to predict the value of the outputs. Because certain components may fail, 
a system description that only allows for correct behavior will be inconsistent with 
observations of incorrect behavior. Therefore, abnormality predicates are introduced. For 
any component c E COMP, the literal ah(c) denotes the fact that component c is not 
functioning as required. Such a component is said to be abnormal; otherwise it is normal. 
We assume that components usually function correctly. However, because expected 
observations depend on this assumption, the system description will usually contain 
sentences in which anticipated behavior is explicitly predicated on this assumption. Thus 
sentences such as Tab(c;) > a assert that, if component ci is functioning correctly then 
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behavior a! will be observed. The correct functioning of a system is then more accurately 
characterized by the set of sentences 
CORRECT = SD U { lab( ci) I Ci E COMP). 
Throughout we assume that this set CORRECT is consistent. 
If an observation is obtained that is inconsistent with CORRECT then (assuming 
that both the observation and system description are accurate and correct), it must be 
that some of the components have failed; that is, ab(ci) must hold for some members 
c E COMP. I7 A diagnosis for such an observation is any set of components whose 1 
abnormality (alone) makes the observation consistent with SD. More precisely, following 
[ 161, we have these definitions. l8 
Definition 5.1. Let A C COMP be a set of components. Define sentence D(A) to be 
A [{ah(c) : c E d} U {lab(c) : c E COMP - A}] . 
D(A) expresses the fact that the components in A are functioning improperly while 
all other components are functioning correctly. 
Definition 5.2. Let A C COMP . A consistency-based diagnosis (CB-diagnosis for 
short) for observation j? is any D(A) such that SD U {p, D( A)} is satisfiable. 
Reiter’s [49] “Principle of Parsimony” suggests that reasonable diagnoses are those 
that require as few faults as possible to explain the aberrant behavior. A minimal diagno- 
sis is any diagnosis D(A) such that for no proper subset A’ c A is D (A’) a diagnosis. 
In Reiter’s original formulation, only minimal diagnoses are deemed essential. If the 
correct functioning of a system is all that is modeled in SD, then one can show, for any 
diagnosis D(A), that a larger component set A C A’ also determines a diagnosis D (A’). 
Thus, minimal diagnoses characterize the set of all diagnoses. 
Example 5.3. Imagine a simple system with two components, a plug and a light bulb. 
One can observe that the bulb is bright, dim or dark. SD captures the correct behavior 
of the system: 
lab(bulb) A Tab(plug) > bright. 
We assume that the three possible observations are exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
(and that this fact is captured in SD as well). We expect to see a bright light (i.e., 
bright is true), since this is entailed by CORRECT: 
SD U { lab( bulb), Tab(plug) } b bright. 
I7 We will make a few remarks at the conclusion of this section regarding the possibility that SD is an 
incorrect model. 
I* As usual, a “set” of observations will be assumed to be finite and conjoined into a single sentence /3. 
For any set of sentences, uch as SD, we will assume finiteness, and treat the set somewhat loosely as the 
conjunction of its elements. Context should make clear whether the sentence or the set is intended. 
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If we observe dim, then the minimal diagnoses are o({bulb}) and D( (plug}). The 
nonminimal diagnosis D( {bulb,plug}) also renders the observation dim consistent. 
Notice that each of these diagnoses applies to the observation bright as well, even 
though this is the system’s predicted behavior. That is, the diagnoses do not rule out the 
“correct” behavior. 
The presence of fault models renders Reiter’s characterization incorrect. I9 de Kleer, 
Mackworth and Reiter suggest a notion of kernel diagnosis that can be used to replace 
minimal diagnosis in the characterization of all diagnoses. Our goal here is not to 
investigate such characterizations, but rather investigate the semantics of diagnosis as 
explanation. Despite the failure of minimal diagnoses in this characterization task, the 
principle of parsimony (in the absence of more refined, say, probabilistic information) 
suggests that minimal diagnoses are to be preferred. We will simply point out the impact 
of fault models on diagnosis. 
Intuitively, a fault model is a portion of the system description that allows predictions 
to be made when it is known or assumed that some component is faulty. In the example 
above, one cannot predict anything about the brightness of the light if one of the 
components is abnormal. All observations are possible (consistent). Suppose we add 
the following axiom: 
ab(bulb) A ab(plug) > dark. 
While D( {bulb}) and D( iplug}) are both diagnoses for dim, the “larger” diagnosis 
D({bulb,plug}) 1s not. Thus, in the presence of fault models, supersets of diagnoses 
need not themselves be diagnoses. de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter do, however, formu- 
late conditions under which this is guaranteed to be the case. 
5.2. Capturing consistency-based models in CT40 
Just as with our embedding of Theorist, we can provide a CT40-model that captures 
the underlying intuitions of consistency-based diagnosis. We assume that the language 
in which the system description and observations are phrased is propositional, denoted 
LQL. We will assume that for each component in COMP there is a proposition stating 
that the component has failed. We will, however, continue to use the first-order notation 
ab( c) for such a proposition.*’ 
The principle of parsimony carries with it the implicit assumption that situations in 
which fewer system components are abnormal are more plausible than those with more 
components failing. This suggests a natural ordering of plausibility on possible worlds. 
Definition 5.4. Let w be a possible world suitable for Lcp~ and COMP some set of 
system components. The abnormality set for w is the set 
Iy Similar remarks apply to exonerution uxioms, which we do not discuss here. 
*” A first-order diagnostic model can be captured propositionally by using ground terms should the domain 
of components and other objects of interest be finite. A first-order version of our logics could be used but this 
is not relevant to our concerns here. 
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Fig. 6. The CB-model for a two component system. 
Ah(w) = {c E COMP : w ,I= d(c)}. 
Definition 5.5. The consistency-based model (the CB-model) for component set COMP 
is MCOMP = (W; 3, sp) w h ere W is the set of truth assignments suitable for Lcp~; p is 
the valuation function induced by W; and u < w iff Ab( u) C Ab( w) . 
Proposition 5.6. Mco,+,p is a CT40*-model. 
Notice that the CB-model for a set of components i exactly the Theorist model with 
the set of defaults 
23 = {lab(c) : c E COMP). 
We will exploit this fact below when comparing consistency-based and abductive diag- 
nosis. 
The model Mco~p does not rule out worlds violating SD. SD, much like 3 above, 
will be used explicitly in defining diagnoses. Worlds in which %YD holds will not play 
a role in consistency-based diagnosis; therefore, we could easi> use a CT40-model in 
which only SD-worlds are represented (e.g., using the axiom q SD) . a 
Example 5.7. Fig. 6 illustrates the model Mco~p for our simple light bulb example 
with two components. For simplicity, we show only those worlds that satisfy the system 
description SD provided in Example 5.3. As usual, worlds in the same cluster are those 
in which the same components have failed or work correctly. 
The most plausible state of affairs in the model Mco~p is simply the set of worlds 
satisfying the theory CORRECT. Should an observation be made that conflicts with 
*’ However, one could imagine the diagnostic process including the debugging of SD, as takes place for 
instance in model verification, or even scientific theory formation. 
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this theory, the system must bc functioning abnormally and belief in the assumption 
lab(c) for at least one c E C must be retracted. A diagnosis is an explanation, given 
in terms of normal and abnormal components, for such an observation. Clearly a CB- 
diagnosis is not predictive, for it simply must ensure that the observation is rendered 
plausible. In Example 5.3, the sentences D( {bulb}) and D( (plug}) are both diagnoses 
of the observation dim. But neither of these diagnoses entails the observation dim. This 
leads to the notion of an excuse. which is simply a might explanation, as described in 
Section 3, consisting of possible component failures. 
Definition 5.8. Let A g COMP be ;I set of components. Define sentence AB( A) to be 
A [{ah(c) : c E A}] 
Thus, AB( A) asserts that all components in A are functioning abnormally. In contrast 
to the sentence D(A), AB( A) asserts nothing about the status of components not in A. 
Definition 5.9. Let COMP and SD describe some system. An excuse for an observation 
,!? is any sentence A B( A) (where d 2 COMP) such that 
MCOMP t= AB(AJ) A SD + -6 
If belief in the excuse were adopted, the observation would not be disbelieved. For 
instance, the model MCOMP admits excuses D( {bulb}), D( (plug}) and D( {bulb,plug}) 
for the observation dim. Notice that D( 0) (which we assume to be T) is not an excuse 
for dim since the belief bright precludes it; that is, the conditional T A SD + Tdim is 
false. 
Because of the ordering of plausibility built in to the CB-model, when a certain set 
of components is believed to have failed, other components are assumed to still be 
functioning correctly. 
Proposition 5.10. MCOMP /= AB( A) ==+- D(A). 
This proposition ensures that a diagnosis in the CT40 framework (i.e., an excuse) can 
be given solely in terms of failing components. Thus, we have that an excuse determines 
a CB-diagnosis for an observation. 
Theorem 5.11. Let SD and COMP determine some system. D(A) is a CB-diagnosis 
for observation /3 iff AB( A) is an excuse for p relative to MCOMP. 
Naturally, we should not accept any might explanation for an observation as a rea- 
sonable diagnosis. Preferred diagnoses should be those that are most plausible, and the 
ordering of plausibility determined by the model Mco~p can be used for this purpose. 
Unsurprisingly, preferred diagnoses are precisely those that minimize the number of 
abnormal components. 
Definition 5.12. Let D(A) and D( A’) be CB-diagnoses for observation p. D(A) is at 
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Fig. 7. The addition of a fault axiom. 
least as preferred as D (A’) (written D(A) &o~p D (A’) ) iff 
MCOMP /= &D(d’) 3 OD(d)). 
D(A) is a preferred diagnosis iff there is no diagnosis for /3 such that D (A’) &o~p 
D(A). 
Theorem 5.13. D(A) is a preferred diagnosis iff D(A) is a minimal diagnosis. 
5.3. Predictive diagnoses and fault models 
Consider the light bulb example above with the additional axiom 
ab(bulb) A ab(pZug) > dark 
incorporated into the system description SD. Fig. 7 illustrates the model Mco~p for this 
new system SD,V. This additional axiom will be dubbed a fault axiom or a partial fault 
model. If all axioms have a “positive form” (i.e., describing behavior based only on 
conditions of normality), then diagnoses (or assumptions of abnormality) can never be 
used to predict aberrant behavior. In other words, all “observations” are consistent with 
each (nonempty) diagnosis. Fault models change the nature of diagnosis by making 
it a more “nonmonotonic process”. For instance, without this fault axiom, the two 
excuses AB( {bulb}) and AB( (plug}) determine diagnoses for the observation dim, 
as does the larger diagnosis AB( { bulb,plug}) . This forms the basis for Reiter’s 1491 
characterization of all diagnoses in terms of minimal diagnoses. However, with the fault 
axiom, the sentence AB({bulb,plug}) is not an excuse for dim: 
Mco~p b AB({buZb,plug}) A SDF + Tdim. 
This reflects the observation of de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter that supersets of diag- 
noses need not be diagnoses themselves. In our terminology: 
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Proposition 5.14. If AB( A) is an excuse for observation, AB( A’) need not be, where 
A 2 A’. 
Fault models have another impact on the nature of diagnosis. Consider the ob- 
servation dark. One diagnosis for this observation (relative to SDF) is the excuse 
AB( {bulb,plug}): 
Mco~p k AB( {bulb,plug}) A SDF Q -dark. 
Without fault axioms (i.e., using SD rather than SD,V), such an excuse renders the 
observation plausible, but does not preclude other observations. However, with the fault 
axiom we have an even stronger predictive condition: 
Mco~p k AB ( {bulb, plug}) I? SDF + dark. 
Not only does the diagnosis render dark plausible, it also induces belief in the observation 
dark. 
Naturally, one might extend the definition of a diagnosis by requiring not only that 
the observation be rendered consistent, but also that it be entailed by the diagnosis. Such 
diagnoses will be dubbed predictive diagnoses. 
Definition 5.15. Let A c COMP A predictive diagnosis for observation /3 is any D( A) 
such that SD U {D(A)} k /3 and SD U {D(A)} is consistent. 
Theorem 5.16. Assume D(A) A SD is consistent. D(A) is a predictive diagnosis for 
Pifs 
MCOMP l= AB(A) A SD =+ P. 
Predictive diagnoses are predictive explanations rather than might explanations, and as 
such carry many of the conceptual advantages of predictive explanations. Unfortunately, 
for most systems, one cannot expect diagnoses to be predictive in most circumstances. 
Typically, the knowledge of how a system fails is incomplete. One may know that a 
weak battery causes an LED display to show “strange” readings, but the specific observed 
display in such a circumstance is not usually predicted by a diagnosis. However, with 
partial fault models one will have that certain diagnoses predict the observations they 
explain, rather than just excusing them. 
If one has a complete fault model incorporated into SD, intuitively every diagnosis 
carries with it a prediction about the behavior that can be observed. Thus, one would 
expect that every CB-diagnosis, in the process of excusing the observation, would 
actually predict it. This leads to general circumstances under which every CB-diagnosis 
of an observation for a particular system is a predictive diagnosis. We assume that the 
system’s behavior can be characterized by a given set of possible observations 0, the 
elements of which must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive (relative to SD). 22 We 
” One may expect a number of possible observations of correct behavior, for instance, corresponding to the 
possible inputs to a circuit. However, we treat this as a single observation, the form of which will typically 
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We say that SD contains a complete fault model iff for each diagnosis D(A) there is a 
p such that 
D(A) ASD~pAOP. 
Notice that a complete fault model, on this definition, ensures that one has a complete 
model of correct behavior (simply set A = 8). If required, we could restrict A to 
nonempty sets of components, thus decoupling the model of faulty behavior from that 
of correct behavior. 
If SD contains a complete model of correct behavior and a complete fault model, it 
is easy to see that each consistency-based diagnosis will be predictive. Consider our 
light bulb example once again, with observable behaviors bright, dim and dark and the 
following axioms in SD (the first models correct behavior, the second and third are fault 
axioms) :
(Tab( bulb) A lab(plug) ) > bright, 
(ab( bulb) = Tab(plug) ) > dim, 
(ab(bulb) A ab(plug)) > dark. 
Clearly, any excuse we can make for a given observation will also predict that observa- 
tion. In this example, every CB-diagnosis is a predictive diagnosis. 
Proposition 5.17. If SD includes a complete fault model then D(A) is a CB-diagnosis 
for /3 13 D(A) is a predictive diagnosis for /L 
Notice that to diagnose faulty behavior only, a model of correct behavior is not 
required-a complete fault model ensures that predictive xplanations can be given for 
every “abnormal” observation. However, without any indication of correct behavior any 
observation is consistent with the assumption that all components work correctly. Thus, 
a complete model of correct behavior is required if CB-diagnoses are to be of any use. 
This is in accordance with the observation of Poole [ 451 who describes the categories of 
information required for consistency-based diagnosis and abductive diagnosis. Console 
and Torasso [ 131 have also addressed this issue. They suggest, as we have elaborated 
above, that consistency-based diagnosis is appropriate if fault models are lacking, while 
abductive approaches are more suitable if models of correct behavior are incomplete. 
be a conjunction of implications or biconditionals. The antecedents will determine certain inputs and the 
consequents certain outputs (e.g., on A lab(bulb) > bright). Similar remarks apply to incorrect behavior. 
This is not the main point of our description so we do not pursue this issue further. 
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It is important to notice that the definition of complete fault model above relies 
crucially on the set of propositions one is allowed to explain, in other words, the set of 
“observables”. For example, suppose we had only a single fault axiom: 
(ab( bulb) V ab(plug) ) 3 (durk V dim). 
This fault model is incomplete relative to the original set of observables, for no CB- 
diagnosis for dim actually predicts dim. Each diagnosis, D( {bulb}), D( {plug}) and 
D( {bulb,plug}), allows the possibility of observation dark. However, suppose we “co- 
alesce” the observations dim and dark into a single category notBright E dim V dark. If 
the observations a system is allowed to explain are restricted to bright and notBright, 
this fault model is complete; any CB-diagnosis will then predict its observation. In this 
example, D(8) predicts bright, while the other three diagnoses predict notBright. If 
users are allowed to make more refined observations, predictive diagnoses can be given 
if observations are mapped into coarse-grained explainable propositions. 
5.4. On the relationship to abductive diagnosis 
Let us assume that we have a Theorist default theory for the diagnosis of a system 
where SD is taken to be the set of facts and the default set is 
V = {lab(c) : c t COMP} 
As observed above, the Theorist model for such a theory is precisely the CB-model 
for this system. If we restrict Theorist explanations to those of the form used for 
consistency-based diagnosis, some interesting relationships emerge. 
Suppose that Theorist explanations are restricted to have the form AB( A) (or D(A) ). 
We will call these explanations Theorist diagnoses. Such weak explanations are then 
guaranteed to be predictive. This is due simply to the fact that the most plausible worlds 
at which such an explanation holds must lie within a single cluster. In other words, 
Theorist diagnoses have a single extension. 
Proposition 5.18. Let A C COMP. Mco~p k AB (A) + p ifs MCoMP k AB( A) + p. 
(Similarlyfor D(A).) 
Should we model a system in Theorist as we do for consistency-based diagnosis, 
then Theorist diagnoses are exactly predictive diagnoses as we have defined in the 
consistency-based framework. 
As we have seen, many (if not most) observations cannot be predicted in the 
consistency-based framework, especially if fault-models are lacking or incomplete. This 
indicates that the abductive approach to diagnosis requires information of a form dif- 
ferent from that used in the consistency-based approach. This is emphasized by Poole 
[ 4.51. However, given complete fault models, Theorist diagnoses and consistency-based 
diagnoses will coincide. Konolige [ 3 11 has also examined the relationship between the 
two forms of diagnosis. 
Without complete information, the Theorist system, in particular the notion of an 
extension, can still be used to effect consistency-based diagnosis. While a CB-diagnosis 
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may not predict an observation, it does require that the observation is consistent with 
all other “predictions”. In Theorist terms, the observation is consistent with the (single) 
extension of the diagnosis. In other words, these are might explanations in the Theorist 
model. 
Theorem 5.19. Let SD and COMP describe some system, A 5 COMP, and D be the 
set of defaults {Tab(c) : c E COMP}. Then D(A) is a CB-diagnosis for observation j3 
iff -p $ E where E is the (only) Theorist extension of (SD U {AB( A)}, Vj. 
Corollary 5.20. D(A) is a CB-diagnosis for observation /3 iff MD t= SD A AB( A) + 
-P. 
Thus, consistency-based diagnosis can be captured in the Theorist abductive frame- 
work without requiring that the form of the system description be altered. SD is simply 
used as the set of facts 3. Poole [45] also defines a form of consistency-based di- 
agnosis within Theorist. He shows that AB( A) is a “consistency-based diagnosis” iff 
D(A) is in some extension of SD U {p}. 0 ur notion of consistency-based diagnosis 
in Theorist does not rely on forming extensions of the observation, but (more in the 
true spirit of abduction) examines extensions and predictions of the explanation itself. 
This is important because our definition captures all CB-diagnoses. Poole’s definition 
is based on Reiter’s [49] definition of diagnosis in terms of minimal sets of abnormal 
components. It is not hard to see that, in fact, D(A) is in some extension of SD U {p} 
iff D(A) is a minimal CB-diagnosis. While Poole’s observation is correct for minimal 
diagnoses (and Reiter’s formulation, in particular), it cannot be extended to the more 
general case subsequently developed by de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter. 
Console and Torasso [ 131 have also explored the distinction between abductive and 
consistency-based diagnosis and present a definition of explanation (in the style of 
Reiter) that combines both types. The set of observations to be explained are divided 
into two classes: those which must be predicted by an explanation and those which 
must simply be rendered consistent by the explanation. We can, of course, capture such 
explanations conditionally by using both predictive and weak explanations. Roughly, if 
p is the part of the observation that needs to be predicted and y is the component 
that must be consistent with the explanation (and background theory) then we simply 
require that any explanation cy be such that LY =+ p and LY + ly. 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have presented some general conditions on epistemic explanations, describing 
a number of different types of explanations, and why certain explanations are to be 
preferred to others. Our account relies heavily on a model of belief revision and con- 
ditional sentences. The defeasible nature of explanations and preferences for plausible 
explanations are induced naturally by the properties of our revision model. We have also 
shown how the two main paradigms for model-based diagnosis can be embedded in our 
conditional framework. 
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A number of avenues remain to be explored. We are currently investigating how 
our model might be extended to incorporate causal explanations. Such explanations, 
especially in diagnostic and planning tasks, are of particular interest. Grafting a repre- 
sentation of causal influences onto our model of explanation, such as that of Goldszmidt 
and Pearl [ 271, seems like a promising way in which to (qualitatively) capture causal 
explanations. Konolige [32] has explored the use of causal theories in diagnosis as a 
means to obviate the need for fault models. His representation in terms of default causal 
nets allows both explanations and excuses; but the causal component of his represen- 
tation remains essentially unanalyzed. The key features of Konolige’s theories can be 
captured in our framework in a rather straightforward way. These include exemptions of 
“faults”, distinguishing normality conditions from primitive causes and preferences for 
normal and ideal explanations. This is due to the flexibility of the conditional logic and 
the generality of plausibility orderings. We also hope to explore the issue of designing 
tests to discriminate potential diagnoses, and the trade-off between further testing and 
repair. This is an issue that has recently attracted much attention [ 19,391. 
The pragmatics of explanation remains an important avenue to pursue. Ways in which 
to rule out weak or strong explanations, depending on context must be addressed. 
Another pragmatic concern has to do with the elaboration of explanations. We have 
assumed that explanations are given relative to background theory. If an explanation 
is questioned, or elaboration is requested, this may be due to the fact that certain 
background is not shared between the abductive system and the user requesting the 
explanation. Mechanisms with which the appropriate background knowledge can be 
determined, and offered as elaboration, would be of crucial interest. The manner in 
which an explanation is requested by a user can also provide clues as to what form an 
explanation should take [ 581. 
Other forms of explanation cannot be captured in our framework, at least in its current 
formulation. An important type of explanation is of the form addressed by the theory 
of GIdenfors [ 221. There an explanation is simply required to render an observation 
more plausible than it was before the explanation was adopted. As an example, consider 
possible explanations for Fred’s having developed AIDS (A). A possible (even reason- 
able) explanation is that Fred practiced “unsafe” sex (U). However, it would seem that 
adopting the belief U is not sufficient to induce the belief that Fred contracted HIV 
and developed AIDS. Furthermore, if the probability is low enough, this might not even 
be a valid might explanation; that is, U + TA. However, U does increase the likeli- 
hood of A (even if not enough to render A believable, or even epistemically possible). 
Such explanations might be captured by comparing the relative plausibility of A given 
U and A alone, without appeal to probabilities. Such an example may suggest a role 
for decision-theoretic versions of conditional defaults. While A may be unlikely given 
U, the consequences of developing AIDS are so drastic that one may adopt a default 
U =+ A: one should act as if A given U. Preliminary investigations of such defaults, in 
a conditional setting, may be found in [ 8,421. These may lead to a “practical” form of 
explanation, with some basis in rational action. 
On a related note, our model can be extended with probabilistic information. Boutilier 
[ 51 shows how the notion of countelfactual probabilities can be grafted onto the con- 
ditional logic CO. Probabilistic information can then be used to determine explanations 
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of the type described by Gtidenfors, explanations that are “almost predictive” and to 
distinguish equally plausible explanations on probabilistic grounds. This should allow 
a very general model of explanation and diagnosis. We should also remark that the 
conditional framework allows arbitrary orderings of preference. The orderings described 
above for Theorist and consistency-based diagnosis are merely illustrative. Generally, 
orderings need not be determined by default violation and set inclusion. One may, for 
example, decide that worlds violating the system description of some artifact are more 
plausible than worlds where a large number of system components have failed. So if 
some observation can only be diagnosed with a large number of failures, one may pre- 
fer to adopt the hypothesis that the model of the system is in fact inaccurate. Such a 
viewpoint would be necessary in system design and verification. 
Finally, we have neglected an important class of explanation, namely, observations 
that are explained by appeal to causal or scientific laws. Our explanations have taken 
for granted a background theory with appropriate conditional information. However, 
especially in the realm of scientific theory formation, explanations are often causal laws 
that explain observed correlations. Such explanations require a model of belief revision 
that allows one to revise a theory with new conditionals. One such model is proposed 
in [ 1 l] and may provide a starting point for such investigations. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of main theorems 
Proposition 3.1. If LX, p E K, then j3 E (Ki ) z iff -MY E KT$ 
Proof. Let M be an appropriate K-revision model for the contraction and revision 
function in question. We have /I E (K; )z iff p is true at each a-world in 11 (KF ) 11, 
i.e., iff /? holds at (IlKI U min(+?)) rl IIaII ( since LY E K). This holds iff there is no 
a-world in min( -p) iff SLY E Kzp. 0 
Proposition 3.2. Zf TY, -p E K, then SLY E (K;,)$ iff p E Kz. 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.1. 0 
Proposition 3.4. Zf a, j3 E K then a (predictively) explains p iff -p + TX 
Proof. If (Y, /3 E K then condition (A), LY + p, holds trivially (since 11 KII = min( cu) = 
min(/?)). 0 
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Proposition 3.5. If a, /3, -MY, -/3 6 K then cy (predictively) explains /3 iff LY + p iff 
+I =+ 7cX. 
Proof. If a,& la, -+ $ K, then mitt(a) C llKj[ and min( lp) C llK]l. Thus, 
min(a) C lIPI iff min(TP) C ll~ll. 0 
Proposition 3.6. If TY, -p E K then Q (predictively) explains j3 i# (Y + p. 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.4. 0 
Proposition 3.9. If a is a predictive explanation for p then cz is a might explanation 
for P. 
Proof. The condition (ES) for predictive explanations guarantees the condition (F) for 
might explanations, while a + p t-040 a + -/? (for satisfiable a). 0 
Proposition 3.11. If LY is a weak explanation for p then (Y is a might explanation for 
P. 
Proof. a + p i-n40 a + -/3 (for satisfiable a). 0 
Proposition 3.13. Let /? E K and Q be a predictive explanation for p. Then a is a 
preferred (hypothetical) explanation for p in Ki. 
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 3.1 and the fact that (Y is epistemically 
possible in belief state Ki (due to the fact that any explanation (Y must be in K) . c7 
Proposition 3.14. Let CY be a predictive explanation for p relative to model M. Then LY 
is a preferred explanation iff M 1 j3 -ft TLY. 
Proof. This fact holds trivially for accepted and indeterminate /?, since there is a unique 
minimal /?-cluster (those P-worlds satisfying K), and it must intersect IIayII if cy is a 
predictive explanation. Suppose -p E K. 
If /? + -WZ, then there is some minimal p-cluster C such that M b, SLY for each 
w E C. Since p predictively explains itself (see below), we note that p is a strictly 
preferred to a. To see this, notice that for any w E C we have M b, 10~1 (since 
a + j3, and any such w is in min(P)). 
lf p,+ yff, then each minimal /3-cluster C contains some a-world. Thus, we have 
M b q ( /? > 0~) : a is at least as plausible as p. Clearly, no explanation cr’ of /3 is 
more plausible than p (for then a’ 3 p is impossible). Thus, a is preferred. 0 
Proposition 4.13. E is an extension of (F, D) ifs [IElI = S for some S E N(3). 
Proof. By definition of MD and Proposition 4.12, S E Pl( .F) iff S consists of the set of 
worlds satisfying F U D, where D C D is some maximal subset of defaults consistent 
with 3. By definition of an extension, S = lIEI for some extension E. 0 
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Theorem 4.15. A is predicted (in Theorist sense) from default heory (3, V) i$ MD j= 
3=5 A. 
Proof. We have that A is predicted iff A is in all extensions of 3. By Proposition 4.13, 
this is the case iff S C [[All for all S E H(3). Since min(3) = @Z(3), this holds iff 
3+A. 0 
Theorem 4.16. Let C C C. Then C is a Theorist explanation for p iff Mp k (3 A C) -+ 
/3 and 3 A C is consistent. 
Proof. C is a Theorist explanation for /3 iff 3 U D U C b /3 for some D G D and 
3 U D U C is consistent. This is equivalent o p belonging to some extension of the 
(consistent) set 3 U C, which holds (by Proposition 4.13) iff S Z /[/3ll for some 
S~P1(3UC)relativetoMz,iffMvk(3AC)-+P. Cl 
Theorem 4.18. Let C c C. Then C is a predictive Theorist explanation for f3 if 
Mz, k (3 A C) + p and 3 A C is consistent. 
Proof. This follows immediately from Definition 4.17 and Theorem 4.15. •! 
Theorem 4.20. Let C, C’ C C be predictive Theorist explanations for p, relative to 
(3,D). Then C <F C’ iff MD k E((C’ A 3) > O(C A 3)). 
Proof. By definition of <F, C is preferred to C’ iff each subset of defaults D’ consistent 
with C’U~ is contained in some subset of defaults D consistent with CU3. By definition 
of Mv and Proposition 4.12, this is the case iff each world satisfying C’ U 3 sees some 
worldsatisfyingCUF,iffMz,b?J((C’A3) >O(C A3)). Cl 
Proposition 4.34. Let MB be the Brewka model for (Dl , . . . , Dn) and Mz) the Theorist 
model for its reduction D = D1 U . . . UD,,. Then u 6 w in Mn whenever v < w in Mp. 
Proof. If u 6 w in Mv, then V(u) G V(w) relative to the flat set of defaults D. Clearly 
then K(u) C V;:(w) for each i relative to the prioritized set of defaults. By definition, 
u<winMa. 0 
Theorem 4.35. If Mz, k a + p then Mn + a + p. 
Proof. By Proposition 4.34, it is clear that the set of minimal cu-worlds in the Brewka 
model Mn is a subset of the minimal a-worlds in the Theorist model MD. Thus, if 
Mvbcu+pthenMakcu+p. q 
Theorem 5.11. Let SD and COMP determine some system. D(A) is a CB-diagnosis 
for observation /I iff AB( A) is an excuse for p relative to Mco~r. 
Proof. By definition, AB( A) is an excuse for /3 iff Mco~r /= AB( A) A SD + +?. We 
note that this relation can hold only if AB( A) A SD is consistent. Given this consistency 
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and Proposition 5.10, we have that AB( A) is an excuse iff MCOMP k D(A) A SD + -p 
(this follows from the valid schematic entailment of A A B j+ C from A + B and 
A # C). This holds iff SD U {p, D(A)} is consistent iff D(A) is a CB-diagnosis for 
0. cl 
Theorem 5.13. D(A) is a preferred diagnosis iff D( A) is a minimal diagnosis. 
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of MCOMP. 0 
Theorem 5.16. Assume that D(A) A SD is consistent. D(A) is a predictive diagnosis 
for P iff 
MCOMP l= AB(A) A SD =+ P. 
Proof. We observe that min( D( A) A SD) consists of the set of all worlds satisfying 
D(A) A SD by definition of MCOMP. Thus 
MCOMP +D(A) A SD+P 
iff SD U {D(A)} k p, i.e., iff D(A) is a predictive diagnosis. By Proposition 5.10, 
MCOMP kD(A) A SD =+ P 
iff 
MCo,,.,P kAB(A) A SD + /3. 0 
Proposition 5.18. Let A C COMP. Mco~p k AB( A) + p iff Mco~p b AB( A) + /3. 
(Similarlyfor D(A).) 
Proof. As observed above, the set of clusters in the model Mco~p are distinguished 
by the set of components they take to be normal and abnormal. This means that the 
sets Pl( AB( A) ) and Pl( D( A) ) are singletons consisting of a single cluster each, these 
clusters being exactly min( ( AB( A) ) and min( (D(A) ) respectively. Thus, AB( A) + j? 
iff AB(A) + /3 and D(A) + p iff D(A) + p. 13 
Theorem 5.19. Let SD and COMP describe some system, A C COMP, and V be the 
set of defaults {Tab(c) : c E COMP). Then D(A) is a CB-diagnosis for observation /3 
iff -p # E where E is the (only) Theorist extension of (SD U {AB( A)}, D). 
Proof. We assume that SD U {D(A)} is consistent. By Theorem 5.11, D(A) is a CB- 
diagnosis for j3 iff 
MCOMP i= AB(A) A SD + -P. 
As indicated in the proof of Proposition 5.18, there is a unique minimal SDU {AB( A)}- 
cluster in Mco~p; and as described in Section 4, this cluster determines the Theorist 
extension E of SD U {AB( A)}. Thus, 
MCOMP i= AB(A) f, SD + -P 
iff -/3 $?J E. q 
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